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1. INTRODUCTION 
Veritas vos liberabit, chanted the scholastics of yesteryear. The truth 
will setyoujree, echo their latter-day counterparts in the academy, intoning 
the mantra reverentially but with increasingly more hope than confidence, 
more faith than conviction. 
By and large, universities would like themselves to be perceived as 
places of culture in a chaotic world, protectors of reasoned discourse, 
peaceful havens where learned professors roam orderly quadrangles and 
ponder higher thoughts. Their slick brochures and elegant catalogues 
depict a community of scholars, serious and fair-minded at both work and 
play, all thirsting for knowledge in sylvan tranquility, all feasting on the 
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fruits of unfettered intellectual curiosity, all nurtured in an atmosphere of 
invigorating academic freedom, in an altogether overflowing cornucopia in 
the ever-bustling marketplace of ideas. 
The real world of the academy, of course, is not quite that wonderful-
nor nearly as bad as many would suggest. The ironies become palpable, 
however, when those self-same institutions, which almost universally view 
themselves as bastions of free speech, instead stifle debate that is perceived 
as politically incorrect or otherwise embarrassing. Academic 
administrators naturally shy away from conflict and contention. They shun 
controversy. They abhor negative publicity of any kind, quelling it as 
heavy-handedly as conservative corporations whose primary concern is to 
ensure a profitable bottom line. Thus universities have become intuitively 
reluctant to sponsor ideas that clash too loudly. The research and 
scholarship they most enthusiastically support is that which curries 
favorable coverage from the media and attracts large amounts of dollars 
from alumni. 
It is all the more anomalous that universities appear ignorant of long-
established legal obligations, responsibilities, and limitations, a fact 
painfully apparent from the many speech and conduct codes they 
promulgate that have been found patently unconstitutiona1.1 
Yet how should such institutions respond when students, professors, 
or outsiders foster bigotry and intolerance? Not all controversy on campus, 
unfortunately, is in the pursuit of Noble Truth. Must universities provide 
an open forum for all points of view, whether well-intentioned or 
venomous? Need they accede to demands from student groups or faculty 
members seeking to sponsor speakers who are purposefully contentious? 
Can they not draw a fair-minded line between civil-rights activists and 
hate-mongering bigots, between welfare reformers or publicity-seeking 
dissidents, between passionate anti-abortionists who condemn their 
opponents as "murderers" and strident anti-Semites who call Jews "blood-
suckers?,,2 
Most schools have some sort of procedures in place to deal with 
controversial speakers, but few such policies are informed by an adequate 
understanding of either constitutional law or academic freedom. Moreover, 
the law itself is in a state of flux and conflict, struggling to relax if not 
resolve the tension inherent between the First Amendment's guarantee of 
free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protection. 
1. See infra Parts I.e., II.A.3. 
2. See infra Part I.B. 
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There is thus a great need for reasoned guidelines - rules and regulations 
that do justice to the academic enterprise without doing violence to the 
moral, legal, and social principles upon which legitimate scholarship is 
based and from which it derives support. 
This article reviews the historical context of controversial speakers on 
campus, examines various liberties and limitations accorded them under the 
Constitution, and suggests clear and effective standards for dealing with 
contentious speech in an academic setting. 
II. CATCALLS FROM THE IVORY TOWER: AN HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT 
A. THE ACADEMIC ENTERPRISE 
Thomas Jefferson described the university as a place where "we are 
not afraid to follow truth, wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate error so long 
as reason is left free to combat it.,,3 That ideal has been frequently 
embellished, such as in this statement from the president of Harvard 
University: 
Universities have a special interest in upholding free speech. 
Educational institutions exist to further the search for truth and 
understanding and to encourage the personal development of all who 
study and work within their walls. Because their right to speak freely 
and the opportunity to enjoy an open forum for debate are so closely 
related to these central purposes, the university has a stake in free 
speech that goes beyond the interest of its members. Its integrity as an 
institution is bound up in the maintenance of this freedom, and each 
denial of the right to speak diminishes the university itself in some 
measure.4 
The Supreme Court has steadfastly affirmed the commitment to free 
speech in the American public education system. While school 
administrators have an important obligation to maintain order, they must 
nevertheless abide by First Amendment principles. "[Neither] students 
[nor] teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate."s This is especially true in the public 
university arena, where the Court has underscored the importance of 
safeguarding academic freedom for the "marketplace of ideas." Thus the 
"vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than 
3. Alvin L. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 
54 Ky. L.J. 643, 646 (1966) (quoting THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 196 (1859)). 
4. Letter from Derek Bok to the Harvard community (Sept. 21,1984). 
5. Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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in the community of American schools," and regulations must be struck 
down that "cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom 'by violating the 
First Amendment.",6 
Such noble sentiments, however, have seldom been tested against the 
onslaught of hate speech increasingly being uttered on American campuses. 
Moreover (as the Supreme Court has likewise recognized), universities 
frequently appear ill-equipped to deal with controversial speech from 
outsiders: "The relatively placid life of the college campus of the past has 
not prepared either administrators or students for their respective 
responsibilities in maintaining an atmosphere in which divergent views can 
be asserted vigorously, but civilly.,,7 
Often, in fact, the three groups primarily involved with deciding who 
speaks on campus- administrators, faculty, and students- are confused by 
conflicting concepts of constitutional guarantees and restrictions. Few of 
them fathom the nuances that differentiate the liberties of private 
institutions from the limitations of public ones, nor recognize that the First 
Amendment prohibits only the federal government from making any law 
"abridging the freedom of speech,,,8 nor that its subsequent application to 
the states bridles only state actors.9 
B. CONTROVERSIES AND REPERCUSSIONS 
I. Changing Climates on Campus 
Conditions for controversy have long been part of the university 
experience: Natural challenges to establishment values, and inherently 
diverse student populations, often generate highly-charged confrontations, 
many of which can intensify quickly and explode in acrimony. For the 
most part, the clashes in the past were ideological in nature, over either 
political or philosophical issues involving the competing American values 
of individualism and communitarianism, or specific debates about military 
actions, religion, abortion, or communism.10 Nevertheless, few cases 
6. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
7. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 195-96 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
8. U.S. CONST., amend. I. 
9. The First Amendment's bar against "abridging the freedom of speech" is "among the 
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
10. See LAURENCE MARcuS, FIGlITlNG WORDS: THE POLmCS OF HATEFUL SPEECH (1996) 
147-48. Mr. Marcus was a member of the Board of Trustees at Kean College when Khalid 
Muhammad appeared there. 
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involving controversial speakers on campus were litigated in the courts 
before the second half of the twentieth century. 
The modem campus free-speech movement was born in 1964 at the 
University of California (Berkeley), where thousands of students protested 
a university ban against factional fund-raising. The political tides turned 
over the next few decades, to a point when in 1993~ United Nations 
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was loudly heckled by a conservative group 
called Students Against Intervention in EI Salvador. ll Similar right-wing 
protests occurred in 1987 at the Harvard Law School, where a Nicaraguan 
resistance leader was shouted off the stage as he was about to begin a 
speech,12 and in 1994 at the University of South Florida, where a violent 
demonstration resulted from the on-campus appearance of a Cuban exile 
who advocated negotiations with Fidel Castro.13 Even purely political 
debate, often cited as the inviolable purpose of the First Amendment, has 
been placed off-limits at some educational institutions.14 
Recently, however, the most controversial speakers- whether students, 
faculty, or outsiders- represent a new breed: Not only do they cross the 
political and ideological spectrum, but they frequently straddle the 
exceedingly thin line between controversial speech and hate speech. 
Which of their words must be protected, and which can be punished? 
Official responses to inflammatory utterances have often been arbitrary, 
capricious and unless they are challenged in court and found to be 
unconstitutional, chilling if not punitive. Moreover, for every speaker who 
prevails in litigation, there are many more who choose not to challenge 
their punishments. 
11. The university chancellor said he was "embarrassed that Berkeley has been advertised 
around the world as a place that succumbed to mob rule," '''and that campus officials were 
concerned that speakers who have the philosophy and opinion of the (political) right'" are rarely 
invited because offear of disturbances. U.P.I. (Mar. 15, 1983). 
12. See Dr. Adolfo Calero, Contra Leader, To Speak at Harvard Law School, PRo 
NEWSWIRE, (Nov. 19, 1987). 
13. See Marlene Sokol, Violence Mars Exile Leader's Talk, ST. PETERSBURG TIr-.ms, Dec. I, 
1994, at lB. 
14. See, e.g., Wilson V. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1361 (D. Or. 1976). In 1976, an 
Oregon school board issued an order prohibiting "all political speakers" from a public high 
school. See also Joan Biskupic, For Justice Thomas, Work is Refuge; After 1 1/2 Years, Cloister of 
the Court Extends to Most of His Life, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1993, at AI. Evenjustices of the 
Supreme Court are not immune from vociferous dissent when they speak on campus. Most 
notable among them recently has been Clarence Thomas, whose appearance at Mercer University 
in 1993 elicited loud protests. See id 
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2. Civility and Political Correctness 
The question in every case is the balance to be struck between the 
right to be heard and the right to be protected from offensive speech. 
Drawing such a line is especially difficult for civil libertarians who wish 
both to defend free speech and to tolerate (or encourage) diversity. They 
are likely to experience conflicting sentiments when faced with fact 
situations that test each of those often-competing goals. While seeking to 
ensure civil discourse, universities often endanger free speech by endorsing 
(and enforcing) prevailing notions of political correctness. 
At Yale, for example, a student parodying the university's annual 
GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Awareness Days) Week hung up a poster 
announcing "Bad Week: Bestiality Awareness Days." The student was 
charged with "harassment and intimidation" and summoned to appear 
before the Yale College Executive Committee, consisting of students, 
faculty members, and deans. His hearing was conducted in secret, with no 
right of cross-examination. The committee sentenced him to two years' 
probation. Its decision was final, unappealable, and not accompanied by a 
written explanation. IS 
The University of Connecticut determined that a coed had violated the 
student behavior code by putting a sign on her dorm-room door: "Preppies, 
bimbos, men without chest hair, and homos shot on sight." The code 
prohibited "posting or advertising publicly offensive, indecent or abusive 
matter concerning persons ... and making personal slurs or epithets based 
on race, sex, ethnic origin, disability, religion or sexual orientation." The 
university ordered the offending student to move off campus and stay away 
from the dorms and cafeterias.16 
15. Calling the student's treatment "absolutely dreadful" and "outrageous," the dean of 
Yale's Law School said: 
It would have been perfectly appropriate for faculty and administrators to say that the 
poster was disgraceful and that he should be ashamed of himself, but he should not 
have been in any way punished. I have supported gay rights from the beginning, but 
this was an ideological decision by the committee that violates his free speech rights. 
Nat Hentoff, Guilty Of Committing Free Speech at Yale, WASH. POST, June 7, 1986, at A23. The 
decision against the student was eventually reversed and the penalty rescinded. See Vann 
Woodward, Freedom of Speech, Not Selectively, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1986, at A27; see also 
Hyde and Fishman, The Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991: A Response to the New 
Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 1469, 1483 (1991) (suspension eventually 
rescinded). 
16. The student filed suit, which resulted in the university having to alter the language in its 
code to prohibit only confrontational speech that is "'inherently likely to provoke an imminent 
violent reaction. '" Lauri A. Ebel, University Anti-Discrimination Codes v. Free Speech, 23 N.M. 
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At the University of Pennsylvania, five black females filed 
harassment charges after a student who was trying to study shouted out his 
dorm window, "[s]hut up, you water buffalo. If you're looking for a party, 
there's a zoo a mile from here." University officials asked the student to 
apologize in writing to the women for racially harassing them, and noted on 
his transcript that he violated the school's racial harassment policy. In 
addition, he was placed on residential probation and required to create and 
present a diversity-awareness project.17 At Brown University, which 
prohibits making "someone the focus of your joke" on account of his or her 
race, an intoxicated student was expelled for shouting anti-black, anti-
Semitic, and anti-homosexual epithets.ls 
Other sanctions are applicable to faculty members and administrators 
who, while exercising their rights of free speech, are forced to weather the 
competing winds of political correctness. At Harvard, for example, "a 
professor was forced to cancel a film in his course because it included a 
black maid."19 At the City University of New York, a philosophy professor 
was chastised for publishing several articles asserting that blacks were on 
average "significantly less intelligent" than whites, and that intellectual 
deficiency, not discrimination or poverty, was responsible for the small 
numbers of blacks in certain intellectually demanding fields.20 Although he 
said that these findings had been amply confirmed by research, he noted 
that they represented his personal views, were made outside of the 
classroom, and did not involve indoctrination of students.21 Nevertheless 
protests ensued, and the university investigated. It found that the 
professor's conclusions had the potential to harm the process of education, 
that students should be protected from such harm, and that an alternative 
course should be offered.22 
L. REv. at 172 (1993) (citing How to Handle Hate on Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1989, at 
A30). 
17. See Charles Krauthammer, Defining Deviancy Up, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Nov. 22, 1993, 
at 24-25. 
18. Hyde and Fishman, supra note 15, at 1482, 1488 (quoting Office of Student Life, Brown 
Univ., Racism at Brown (1990) and citing Student at Brown is Expelled Under a Rule Barring 
"Hate Speech, "N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1991, at AI7). At St John Fisher College, students were 
found to have violated the school code when they called the assistant director of campus 
ministries a "feminazi" suffering from "penis envy." Id at 1483 (citing Venere, Incident at [St. 
John] Fisher [College] Sets off Debate on Campus Speech). 
19. Ronald J. Rychlak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags, and Political Correctness: Free 
Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1411, 1426 (1992). 
20. See Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), (affd in part, 966 F.2d 
85,87 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
21. See id. at 908. 
22. See id. at 906-07. In a civil action against the university, the professor prevailed. The 
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Other scholars who speak on campus about racial differences 
experience similar reactions. William Shockley, a Nobel Laureate in 
Physics who held controversial views on the supposed genetic inferiority of 
blacks, was prevented from speaking at Yale in 1974.23 The University of 
Tennessee invited Charles Murray, whose 1994 book, The Bell Curve, 
contended that intelligence levels differ among ethnic groups (with blacks 
and Hispanics near the lowest level), to speak on campus in Chattanooga. 
A group of area teachers urged that his appearance be canceled. By giving 
Murray a forum in which to deliver his message, they said, UTC would be 
endorsing ie4 More recently, there were calls for the removal of a law 
professor at the University of Texas who aired his view that white students 
are academically superior to black and Hispanic students.25 
At the University of New Hampshire, a professor was disciplined for 
violating the school's sexual harassment policy after several women in his 
technical writing course complained about an example he used to explain 
the meaning of the word simile: "Belly dancing is like jello on a plate with 
a vibrator under the plate." The professor received a suspension without 
pay for one year and was ordered to attend counseling sessions.26 
When a dean at Yale urged students to consider the study of Western 
civilization as one of the most important fields offered in the curriculum, 
his remarks were branded as "racist," "sexist," and "obnoxious" by various 
groups on campus, especially blacks and feminists, seeking to root out what 
they perceived as vestiges of a culture dominated by white European 
males.27 
United States Court of Appeals found that his First Amendment rights had been abridged, that the 
university could not punish him for his beliefs, and that even the threat of discipline (through the 
investigating committee) had a chilling effect on his freedom of expression. See Levin, 966 F. 2d 
85,90. 
23. Shockley created a similar stir at Princeton University in 1973. See Priscilla Van Tassel, 
Bowen Reviews His Years At Princeton, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29,1987, at 1; Woodward, supra note 
15, atBI. 
24. Faculty organizers of the lecture held fIrm, stating, "[w]e're not in the business of telling 
people what to think. We're in the business of telling people how to think for themselves." 
Moreover, he pointed out, Murray's lecture would be followed by a speaker with an opposing 
viewpoint. Denise Neil, Teachers Ask UTe to Drop Author's Talk, CHAITANOOGA TIMES, Sept. 
21,1996,atBl,B8. 
25. In this case the demands were thwarted by arguments citing tenure, academic freedom, 
and the First Amendment. See Nicole Cazarez, Professor Graglia's Views Odious, Not 
Unspeakable, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 16, 1997, at A2 I. 
26. See Silva v. University of New Hampshire, 888 F. Supp. 293, 299, 311 (D.N.H. 1994). 
The professor brought suit against the University and its officials for violating his rights under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 332. 
27. Stephen Goode, A Yale Dean Takes On The Thought Police, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 
1991, at EI. 
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Although students, professors, and administrators who pursue their 
rights in court are often ultimately deemed protected by both the First 
Amendment and the concept of academic freedom,28 that result cannot be 
expected as a matter of course. At San Bernardino Community College, a 
professor was accused of sexual harassment for assigning provocative 
essays, using profanities in class, and discussing obscene subjects, such as 
having consensual sex with children.29 The board of trustees ordered him 
to provide a syllabus at the beginning of each class concerning his course 
objectives, attend a sexual harassment seminar, and undergo a formal 
evaluation. The professor sued, but a district court held that the classroom 
comments were matters of public concern, and that the professor's First 
Amendment interests were outweighed by the college's interest in 
effectively educating its students and in preventing a hostile, sexually 
discriminatory environment which would disrupt the educational process.30 
Outsiders seeking a campus platform (the primary focus of this 
Article) present questions that are even more problematic. In 1946, 
members of a California branch of the American Civil Liberties Union 
were required to take loyalty oaths as a precondition to their use of a public 
high school auditorium. (Ironically the ACLU wished to hold a series of 
meetings on "Bill of Rights in Postwar America).,,3! Similarly, in 1962 
Hunter College refused to allow the National Review to use its facilities for 
a series of conservative lectures.32 The school declared its policy in a letter 
from the president: Its campus was not available to "political or other 
public movements or groups in presenting a distinct position or point of 
view opposed by substantial parts of the public.,,33 
28. See infra Section II.B. 
29. See Cohen v. San Bernardino College, 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
30. See id at 1411, 1421. The court also found that the discipline imposed was narrowly 
tailored and that the college's sexual harassment policy was not impermissibly vague or 
overbroad. See id. at 1421. 
31. The requirement was tested in court and struck down: While the state is not required to 
open school doors to outside speakers, said the court, once it does so it cannot exclude them for 
unconstitutional reasons. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 171 28 P.2d 885, 887-
88,891 (Ca 1946). 
32. See Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924,927 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962). 
33. Id. A court subsequently found that various Hunter regulations (for example, that 
programs must be "compatible with the aims of [the] College as a public institution of higher 
learning") were unconstitutionally vague and content-discriminatory. Id at 929-30, 935. In 1968 
restrictive speech statutes in two states were likewise held void for vagueness: a North Carolina 
law which prohibited speech by those who were known to be Communists or who had pleaded 
the Fifth Amendment with respect to subversive activities. See Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 
486, 488, 490, 498-99 (M.D.N.C. 1968). The court noted, nevertheless, that "the Communist 
conspiracy is dedicated to the destruction of freedom, and attempts to achieve its goals of world 
conquest through discord, deceit and untruths." Id. at 497. That same year a North Dakota 
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In 1969 the University of Mississippi barred several speakers, 
including civil-rights activist Charles Evers, from appearing at the 
invitation of the student Young Democratic Club in support of the 
Humphrey-Muskie presidential ticket.34 That same year the president of 
Auburn University, a public institution in Alabama, banned the Reverend 
William Sloan Coffin from speaking on campus on the ground that he 
might advocate breaking the law.35 In 1981, an appearance at Carlow 
College by Sarah Weddington, whose arguments before the Supreme Court 
in Roe v. Wade contributed to its decision striking down state laws 
prohibiting abortions, was canceled by the college president.36 Similarly, a 
1986 speech at Catholic University by Eleanor Smeal, then president of the 
National Organization of Women, was canceled because some students 
complained that her support for legalized abortion conflicted with Catholic 
doctrine.37 
provision that "[prohibited] trustees of a state-owned university from extending use of university 
to facilities to subversive organizations or their representatives" was struck down. Snyder v. 
Board ofTrustees of the University ofIlIinios, 286 F. Supp. 927, 927 (N.D. III. 1968). 
34. See Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 967 n.l, 972-973 (N.D. Miss. 1969). The court 
found that the university had not provided for a fair and adequate review of its president's 
decision to exclude a speaker. See id at 974. Nor were students able to invite speakers 
themselves. See id at 974, n.24. To the contrary, the university's rules barmed political and 
religious speakers arbitrarily, and all those whose presence would "constitute a clear and present 
danger" on campus (an invalid prior restraint). See id at 974-76, n.26, n.28, n.3l. The court held 
that 
speaker regulations may validly provide that no request for a speaker will be honored 
unless made to the university by a recognized student or faculty group within a 
reasonable period of time prior to the proposed speaking engagement, setting forth the 
name of the requesting student organization, the proposed date, time and location of 
the meeting, the expected size of the audience and the time of the speech. 
[d. at 972-73. The executive head of the institution could approve the speaker, but he had to act 
according to procedural due process and not with "unbridled discretion." [d. at 973. The court 
went on to supply a detailed set of regulations for use by the state's universities. See id at 979-
80. 
35. See Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188, 190 (M.D. Ala. 1969), affirmed, 412 
F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1969). The speaker at issue in this case was the Reverend William 
Sloan Coffin. The president was found to have violated the First Amendment by prohibiting the 
speech. The court noted that the speaker had been requested by a student organization and had 
been initially approved; that the president could have rejected the speaker if he reasonably 
thought that by doing so he would prevent violence or disorder; and that the time, place, and 
manner of the speech could likewise have been regulated. Here, however, the university had no 
rules or regulations governing speaker eligibility, and the reasons invoked by the president had 
never been previously used to bar a speaker. See Brooks, 412 F.2d 1171, 1172-73. 
36. See U.P.1. (Oct. 20, 1981). 
37. U.P.1. (Jan. 28, 1986). 
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3. Afro-Centrism and Anti-Semitism 
Anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist speakers began to surface on college 
campuses in the mid-1980's. One of them was Kwame Toure (known in an 
earlier incarnation as the black activist Stokely Carmichael), who in 1986 
appeared at the University of Maryland where, among other outrageous 
statements, he offered his opinion that "[t]he only good Zionist is a dead 
Zionist."38 Similar incidents have increased in recent years in both number 
and intensity. Perhaps most notable among the speakers have been Afro-
Centrists, such as Louis Farrakhan, Leonard Jeffries, Tony Martin, and, 
probably the most inflammatory of them all, Khalid Abdul Muhammad. In 
November of 1993, Muhammad appeared at Kean College, a public 
institution in New Jersey. There, punctuating his remarks with references 
to "Columbia Jew-niversity" and "Jew York City," he said: 
The so-called Jews... crawled out of the caves and heels of 
Europe ... [and] slept in urination and ... defecation, generation after 
generation for 2,000 years. .. [They] knocked [their] animals in the 
head with clubs ... and suck[ ed] the blood from the raw meat, and ... 
still eat ... meat raw to this very day. .. [T]he white so-called Jew 
slumlords in the black community are sucking our blood . .. [They] 
got what was coming to them in Nazi Germany ... [They] control the 
White House and the media... [They] own the Federal Reserve 
System ... Everybody always talk about what Hitler did to the Jews, 
but don't nobody ever asks, "What did the Jews do to Hitler?" The 
Jews had undermined the very fabric of society of that society. The 
way they do wherever they go .. .39 
Jews weren't the only objects of Khalid Muhammad's scorn. He 
called the pope a "no good... cracker," and suggested that someone 
should "raise that dress up and see what's really under there.'>4O He issued 
this rhetorical ultimatum to the whites of South Africa: 
If [they] won't get out of town by sundown, we kill everything white 
that ain't right in South Africa. We kill the women. We kill the 
children. We kill the babies. We kill the blind. We kill the crippled. 
We kill the faggot. We kill the lesbian. We kill them all ... Kill the 
old ones too... Kill the crazy. Goddammit, and when you get 
through killing 'em all, go to the God danm graveyard and dig up the 
38. Barbara Vobejda, U. Md Struggles With Issue of Free Speech, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 
1986, atB4. 
39. Speech, The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews, N.J. L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at 17; 
see also MARCUS, supra note 10, at xvii. 
40. MARCUS, supra note 10, at xvii. 
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grave and kill 'em. God damn, again, 'cause they didn't die hard 
enough.41 
The audience, which was nearly all black, laughed and applauded.42 
A few months later Muhammad appeared at Howard University, a 
publicly-funded institution in Washington, D.C. He had been invited by a 
student group called Unity Nation.43 Before he spoke there was an anti-
Jewish rally led by Unity Nation's leader, a law student named Malik Zulu 
Shabazz.44 The speech itself, in which Muhammad declared that "America 
was founded on separation," and "labeled George Washington and Thomas 
Jefferson as criminals who owned slaves and raped black slave women," 
was enthusiastically received by a crowd of close to 1000.45 Afterwards, 
Howard President, Franklyn Jenifer, condemned the ethnic bias displayed 
at the rally but defended the forum in which it was held.46 Jenifer added 
that he was a deep believer in the First Amendment and academic freedom, 
and that he had often taken the unpopular position that speech should never 
be suppressed unless it directly endangers lives. 
It is far better to allow the expression of hateful views in the light 
of day, where they can be exposed for what they are: vile, 
hurtful, insensitive, and wrong. Instead of sacrificing the First 
Amendment rights that are so precious to us all, we should use 
[them] to counter and condemn such views.47 
Muhammad was invited back to Howard, along with Jeffries and 
Martin, in April of 1994. In the interim, the university postponed a lecture 
to be given by a Jewish history professor from Yale for fear that he would 
41. MARcus, supra note lO, at xvii. 
42. See id. Muhammad had been invited to Kean by the college's student organization, 
which paid him a lecture fee of $2,650. See also No Laughing Matter, THE RECORD, Dec. 21, 
1993, at C7; Jon Nordheimer, Angry Echoes o/Campus Speech, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at 
B4. 
43. See Mensah Dean, Muhammad Speaks at Howard, WASH. TiMEs, Feb. 24, 1994,atC7. 
44. In February 1994, Shabazz warmed up the audience for Khalid Muhammad: "Who is it 
that controls the media and Hollywood in America?" {Audience: "Jews!"} Shabazz: "Who is it 
that has our entertainers in a vice grip and our athletes in their vice grip?" {Audience: "Jews!"} 
Shabazz: "Who is it that has been spying on black leaders and spying on Martin Luther King and 
set up his death?" {Audience: "Jews!"}. Susan Baer and Michael Fletcher, Howard 0.: 'A 
Citadel o/Hate'?, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, May 8,1994. 
45. Dean, supra note 43. 
46. Id. Between the two rallies, the university by "mutual agreemenf' postponed a speech by 
a Jewish history professor from Yale, who said he was concerned about walking into a hostile 
environment. See Kimberly Goad, UT-Dallas Taps a Controversial Administrator as its New 
Chief, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 1994, at IE. 
47. Franklyn G. Jenifer, Hate Speech Is Still Free Speech, N.Y. TiMES, May 13, 1994, at 
A31. 
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be subjected to heckling and harassment because of his ethnicity. 
Ironically, Professor David Brion Davis, whose book, The Problem of 
Slavery in Western Culture, won a Pulitzer Prize in 1967, "was to have 
lectured on the Haitian Revolution of 1791, the first large-scale and 
successful uprising of black slaves in the New World.,,48 
At Muhammad's second coming, the university's security forces 
prevented Jewish protesters from demonstrating. Inside, tables were lined 
with anti-Semitic books. As the auditorium was filling, black men were 
given priority seating.49 During his speech, which was cheered by many of 
the 2,000 in attendance, Khalid declared, "he loves Colin Ferguson, who 
killed all those white folks on the Long Island train." He also said, "I am 
going to be like a pit bull. That is the way I am going to be against the 
Jews. I am going to bite the tail of the honkies."5o 
The remarks were widely reported, and caused a furor both at Howard 
and elsewhere, including on the floor of the United States Congress.51 The 
fallout was extensive. A member of the board of trustees at Howard 
advocated a more restrictive code of conduct for campus clubs and the 
speakers they sponsor.52 At least one corporate donor decided to stop 
contributing to the university, and the United Negro College Fund received 
a flood of angry calls and letters.53 Needless to say, Khalid's speech also 
served to tarnish the image of the student body and faculty at Howard. Nor 
were the ironies lost on outside observers. Commenting on the different 
receptions given to Muhammad and Davis, the Boston Globe editorialized 
that the university's president "protected incitement to violence as 
academic freedom and then told Davis he could not be protected against 
those who were incited. Something sinister is happening at Howard.',s4 
Under increasing pressure from within and without, Howard's board 
of trustees ultimately forced the resignation of the president. 55 But the 
48. Steven A. Hoimes, Howard University Postponed Lecture by a Jewish Historian, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1994, at 9; see Steven A. Hoimes, Struggling Through Crises at Howard 
University, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1994, at AI; Sean Piccoli, Decision Upsets Howard Students 
Jewish Scholar's Lecture Postponed, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al O. 
49. See Piccoli, supra note 48. 
50. Wendy Melillo and Hamil R. Harris, Dissent Raised as Ex-Farrakhan Aide Returns to 
Howard U., THE WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1994, at B 1. 
51. See George Rooney, UCR Group Pressing to Thwart Muhammad, PRESS ENTERPRISE, 
May 27, 1994,atBI. 
52. See Hoimes, supra note 48. 
53. See Hatemongering at Howard, BALTIMORE SUN, May 24, 1994, at 12A. 
54. The Misuse ola University, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21,1994, at 18. 
55. See Brooke Masters, Howard U. Condemns Bigotry, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1994, at B1. 
The president, Franklyn G. Jenifer, insisted that his departure was unrelated to the incident. See 
Jenifer, supra note 47, at 42. 
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backlash continued. A syndicated columnist echoed the sentiment on the 
minds of many civil libertarians: 
Indifference to bigotry is not the same as bigotry itself, but it is too 
close for comfort. Indifference gives bigots running room .... 
Howard had an obligation to respond to the use of its campus by 
bigots. It did nothing of the sort, not at first, anyway, and not when it 
counted most. If Howard is indeed the Harvard of black colleges, then 
it ought to think of how it would have reacted if an anti-black rally had 
been held at Harvard itself, and produced nothing but a yawn. With 
prestige comes obligation .... Neither the First Amendment nor the 
principle of academic freedom means that hatred has to be met with 
silence. The school has learned a lesson. A pity it didn't teach it 
itself.56 
There were repercussions for Khalid Muhammad as well. He was 
subsequently denied platforms at Emory, Howard again, and the University 
ofToronto.57 In 1994, he was shot and wounded at a California rally. 58 In 
1998 he fled New York after police threatened to arrest him for fomenting 
a riOt.59 
The central theme ofFarrakhan, Jeffries, and Martin has been slightly 
less contentious, blaming Jews for leading the enslavement of blacks in the 
United States and minimalizing their place in the history of oppression. At 
first Farrakhan sought to dismiss the uproar surrounding Khalid 
Muhammad as the product of a Jewish conspiracy. "They're trying to use 
my brother Khalid's words against me to divide this house. ... They're 
plotting as we speak." Then, although distancing himself from 
Muhammad's rhetorical excesses, he said, "r stand by the truths Khalid ... 
spoke.,,60 
Farrakhan's Nation ofIslam proclaims loudly that Jewish suffering in 
World War II pales in comparison to that of blacks over the centuries. His 
take on the Holocaust is that "Little Jews died while big Jews made money; 
little Jews were being turned into soap while big Jews washed themselves 
with it." "Anti-Semitic materials like The Protocols of the Elders of Zion 
56. Richard Cohen, What Happened at Howard, WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, atAl7. 
57. In early 1994 the "Black Youth Congress," a student group at the University of Toronto, 
invited Muhammad to speak. Canada's Ministry of Immigration, responding to lobbying by the 
Canadian Jewish Congress, refused to issue him a visitor's pennit on the grounds that he had a 
criminal record and that they had reason to believe he would violate Canada's hate-crime statutes. 
See Clyde Farnsworth, Canada Bars Speech by Ex-Aide of Farra khan, N.Y. 'liMEs, May 1, 1994, 
at 10. 
58. See Bill Whitaker, CBS Morning News, May 30,1994. 
59. See Tom Topousis and Adarn Miller, Safir: Throw 'Coward' Khalid in Slammer N.Y. 
POST, Sept. 7, 1998, at 4. 
60. Hentoff, supra note 15; see also Baer and Fletcher, supra note 44. 
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continue to be available" wherever Farrakhan speaks.6\ Hitler, he says, 
"was a very great man." Judaism, he declares, "is a dirty religion.,,62 
Subsequent to Khalid Muhammad's incendiary appearance at Kean 
College, the college president asked for legal advice on whether it could 
bar Farrakhan (his erstwhile mentor) from speaking there. The answer 
"no" Game in a written opinion from the attorney general of New York: 
"any content-based restriction imposed by a state college on student-
sponsored speakers invited by campus groups is subject to a strict scrutiny 
analysis and is likely to be held unconstitutional.,,63 
In 1993 Jeffries "told a packed house at the Johns Hopkins University 
that Jews dominated the slave trade, that they continue to control the 
nation's power and wealth, and that the white man of any faith represents 
the devil.,,64 Jeffries was removed from his position as chairman of the 
African Studies Department at CUNY, after a 1992 speech in which he 
argued that Jews had financed the Atlantic slave trade and spoke of a 
"conspiracy, planned and plotted and programmed out of Hollywood" by 
Jews and the Italian Mafia to denigrate blacks in films and bring about the 
"destruction of black people.,,65 Jeffries sued. A federal court held that 
CUNY had violated his First Amendment rights by punishing him solely on 
his views.66 This portion of the decision was affirmed by the United States 
Court of Appeals, but in 1996 CUNY eliminated Jeffries' department, 
moving its faculty into a broader ethnic studies division.67 
In 1998 Jeffries was invited to speak at the College of Staten Island. 
The Jewish Defense Organization threatened "to make life miserable" for 
both the speaker and those who had invited him. "Free speech ends when 
61. Aryeh Cohen, Antisemitic Violence Continues to Decline, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 23, 
1998, at 1 (italics added). 
62. Kenneth Lasson, The Tintinnabulation of Bell's Letters, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 18,21 1996. 
63. MARcus, supra note 10, at xxi; see James Abearn, Professor Suggests How to Deal with 
Campus Hate Speeches, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Oct. 29, 1996, at A15. 
64. Kenneth Lasson, Campuses and Common Sense, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, Mar. 16, 
1994, at 11A (noting that Jeffries' appearance was sponsored by university funds). 
65. Karen Arenson, Divided Campus Prepares for an Address by Jeffries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
1,1998, atB3; see Karen Arenson, On Campus, The Cases For and Against Jeffries, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 4, 1998, at B3 (providing that in his 1992 speech Jeffries had labeled blacks as "sun people" 
and whites as "ice people." He also said of the latter: "[y]ou, the intelleclually dead, are hereby 
fonnally notified that my intentions are not to offend anyone. It is to speak the truth as I knew it 
and to ensure to the best of my abilities, the survival of the White Race."). See Jeffries v. 
Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1071, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part, 21 F.3d 1238, 1242 (2d 
Cir. 1994), cert. granted andjudgmentvacated by 513 U.S. 996 (1994). 
66. See Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1098 (stating that "Jeffries is entitled to the 
constilutional protection that surrounds his speech and professional activities."). 
67. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1250 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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bigotry begins," the group's national director said. "Academic freedom 
does not mean the right to teach or preach hate, and Jeffries is doing both." 
Others on campus said they thought the choice of Jeffries as a speaker was 
more likely to discourage than encourage the flow of ideas and were put off 
by what they perceived as his anti-Semitism. The speech was canceled at 
the last minute because of a financial dispute.68 
By his own count Jeffries has appeared at over 300 campuses since 
the notorious 1992 speech. According to him, the College of Staten Island 
was the only school that has ever turned him away.69 Like Jeffries, Martin 
frequently expounds upon what he calls "the Black Holocaust," which he 
describes as the "annihilation of300 million of our people.,,70 As chairman 
of the black studies department at Wellesley College in Massachusetts, he 
is a leading proponent of "Afrocentrism," whose adherents maintain that 
white scholars have covered up, for racist reasons, the cultural debt Europe 
owes to South Africa.71 "[S]tudents are told that Greece was an Egyptian 
colony, Greek philosophy was based on black wisdom and famous figures 
of the ancient world, such as Socrates and Cleopatra, were black.72 
When a colleague at Wellesley challenged those claims, Martin 
responded angrily by charging that she was at the heart of a Jewish 
conspiracy to discredit black scholarship, an assertion that he presented 
elaborately in a book entitled The Jewish Onslaught: Dispatches from the 
Wellesley Battlefront. 73 
Martin assigns his students a book published by the Nation of Islam 
68. See Arenson, On Campus, supra note 65, at B3. Jeffries showed up later on campus to 
have an infonnal chat; he was prevented from entering by security guards. See id 
69. See Arenson, On Campus, supra note 65, at B3. In 1992 Jeffries' appearance at the 
University of South Florida elicited "shock ... dismay and ... disgust" from the southern area 
director of the Anti-Defamation League. Janice Martin, League Decries Controversial Speaker at 
USF, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1992, atB3. 
70. Hillel Juttler, A One-Upmanship of Horrors in Holocaust Comparisons, JERUSALEM 
POST, May 4, 1994, at 7. 
71. Anthony Flint, Black Academics Split on Afrocentrism, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1994, 
at I. 
72. See Michael Gove, The Woman Who Defied Political Correctness, THE TIMEs, Sept. 2, 
1996, at 15. 
73. See id. The professor who challenged Martin was Maxy Lefkowitz, who questioned one 
of his course descriptions in a faculty meeting and critically debunked Afrocentrism as myth in 
THE NEW REpUBLIC, as well as in her own subsequent book, NOT OUT OF AFRICA. A self-styled 
"skeptical feminist," Lefkowitz draws parallels between Afrocentrists and radical feminists who 
rewrite history for their own ideological purposes: "They twisted the truth and blamed past 
inequalities on patriarchal oppression when what limited women's lives was their biology ... 
What liberated women was science, not politics; what will help black students is knowledge, not 
attitudes." See generally Irene Sege, Teaching History or Hate, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 1994, 
at 51. 
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entitled The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews, which claims 
that Jews played a dominant role in the slave trade.74 He also published 
what he called a "'broadside' against 'the privileged and powerful U.S. 
Jewish leadership and their unthinking Negro stooges,''' in which he views 
"the charge of anti-Semitism ... as a weapon ... that has been used by the 
Jewish leadership over the years to beat people over the head with.,,7s 
The difficulty of drawing a line between controversial and offensive 
views is well illustrated by Martin's arguments. The fact that they are 
delivered in the scholarly voice, lending them a patina of authenticity, 
makes them particularly pernicious. Martin's critics find his claims 
disturbingly reminiscent of those made in classic anti-Semitic tracts like the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. His own book (The Jewish Onslaught) 
"goes back and forth between fact and fiction and sees a conspiracy and 
finds enemies at every comer," says a sociologist at Wellesley who uses it 
in a course on propaganda. "He'll talk about perfectly reasonable issues, 
like the marginality of blacks in America, and then come back to Jews.,,76 
C. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO DATE 
Having to respond to various kinds of controversial speech, whether 
political or bigoted, discriminatory or harassing, from students or faculty or 
outsiders, universities have found themselves in an uncomfortable 
quandary. It is often difficult to draw a line between honest opinions and 
hate-filled vitriol, between intellectually defensible, but radical ideas and 
unconcealed exhortations to genocide. Universities seeking to honor both 
the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and the Fourteenth 
Amendment's promise of equal protection often find themselves faced with 
having to reconcile the historic tension between the two principles, in 
situations where there can be no clear winners.77 
It is all the more difficult to apply principles to facts when 
controversial speech leaves the parties involved fragmented, but each with 
a constitutional argument to support its position. For example, there were 
those who felt that (a) Kean College properly granted an open forum to 
74. See generally HISTORICAL RESEARCH DEPAR1MENT, THE NATION OF ISLAM, The Secret 
Relationship Between Blacks and Jews (1991). This assertion has been widely criticized as 
baseless by many historians including Harvard's Henry Louis Gates, who is black and whom 
Martin calls an Uncle Tom. See generally AD! REpORT ON WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR TONY 
MARTIN (1995); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Black Demagogues and Pseudo-Scholars, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 20,1992, at A19. 
75. Sege, supra note 73 (internal quotation omitted). 
76. Id. 
77. See MARCUS, supra note 10, at 114. 
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Khalid Abdul Muhammad as a matter of First Amendment right, even ifhis 
views were offensive; (b) that he should have been heard as an articulate 
advocate of Afrocentrism, which is a legitimate historical perspective; ( c) 
that his appearance should have been set in the format of a debate, where 
his words could have been immediately challenged; or (d) that he should 
never have been allowed to speak because his remarks were anathema to 
the school's educational mission.78 
Traditional champions of free expression argue that it is impossible to 
draw a line between legitimate political speech, even if offensive or non-
constructive, and clearly destructive hate speech. They are fully sensitive 
to the paradoxical position into which they are cast, rendered both 
conservative and reactionary, because they are called upon both to defend 
outrageous speakers and to attack their opponents for denying them their 
rights. At Yale in the mid-1970's, prominent speakers with unpopular 
views, ranging from defenders of the Vietnam War to proponents of white 
supremacy, were invited to address campus groupS.79 The tempestuous 
reactions they engendered led to an unequivocal defense of speakers' rights 
embodied in a statement called "Report of the Committee on Freedom of 
Expression at Yale."so At its core was a declaration that the university must 
do everything possible to ensure within it the fullest degree of intellectual 
freedom, and that "it may sometimes be necessary. .. for civility and 
mutual respect to be superseded by the need to guarantee free expression .. 
. because obstruction of such expression threatens the central function of 
the university."sl "We don't invite people here because we agree with 
them," agreed the president of Princeton University. "The right question, 
well phrased, can be far more effective than preventing people from 
speaking.,,82 
But free-speech advocates are often selective in the interests they 
wish to defend, and are subject to the "tyranny of group self-
righteousness."s3 Nowhere is this more evident than in the proliferation of 
campus spe~ch and conduct codes, which have been increasingly adopted 
and enforced in recent years by both private and public universities. They 
78. Id. at 113. 
79. Woodward,supranote 15,atA27. 
80. Id. 
81. Hentoff, supra note 15, at A23; see also Woodward, supra note 15, at A27; see generally 
Stephen Goode, A Yale Dean Takes On The Thought Police, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1991, at El; 
see also MARcus, supra note 10, at 122. 
82. Priscilla Van Tassel, Bowen Revielvs His Years At Princeton, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 
1987, at Section 11. 
83. "They are on the left and right .... They are terrorists of the mind." Hentoff, supra note 
15 (quoting Bartlett Giamatti, President of Yale University). 
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generally cover the speech and conduct of all members of a university 
community, including faculty. A typical code defines harassment to 
include, "any conduct, verbal or physical, on or off campus. .. which 
creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational, work, or living 
environment" and is premised on the ideas that (a) while freedom of 
expression is essential in a university, so is freedom from unreasonable and 
disruptive offense; and (b) it is usually easier to deal with such questions if 
one thinks in terms of interests rather than rights.84 The number of colleges 
and universities that have adopted such regulations is large and appears to 
be growing.85 Their sponsors have apparently been undeterred by the fact 
that not a single code has yet passed constitutional muster.86 
Public high schools are able to promulgate more restrictive 
procedures than universities. Thus a school district policy can require 
teachers to get approval of principals before they can invite guest speakers 
to their classrooms. In addition, parents must be notified of controversial 
speakers, and students may be excused from the presentations with a 
parent's permission. Such regulations have been set in place to combat 
speakers on gay and lesbian rightS.87 
Every college and university also has different administrative ways 
and means for dealing with controversial speakers, most of which have 
inherent and potential drawbacks. A sampling of representative 
institutions, including three small colleges and two major universities, is 
illustrative. At College A, a rural school which receives some state support 
for buildings and equipment, outside speakers may be brought onto campus 
via (a) a "Programs Board," with an annual budget of approximately 
$4000; (b) the College Activities Office, which spends about $1500 
annually, or (c) individual academic departments. Controversial speakers 
must be approved by the college president, the dean of student affairs, and 
the student government association. Campus security personnel determine 
84. The language is derived from the code at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Bob Chatelle, Democracy is Not for the Thin Skinned, NEWSL. OF THE POL. ISSUES COMM. OF 
TIlE NAT'L WRITERS UNION, Nov. 1993. For web site on hate speech codes, see 
<http://joc.mit.eduldocs/chatelle.speech.codes.txt>. 
85. One observer notes that some 700 colleges and universities have enacted hate speech 
codes by 1990. See Thomas A. Schweitzer, Hate Speech On Campus and The First Amendment: 
Can They Be Reconciledl, 27 CONN. L. REv. 493, 505 nAO (1995) ("[A]pproximately 200 
universities had enacted hate speech codes."). Id 
86. See Lauri A. Ebel, University Anti-Discrimination Codes v. Free Speech, 23 N.M. L. 
REv. 169, 179 (1993). 
87. See, e.g., Sonya Gray, Some Area Schools Have Speaker Policies, PROVIDENCE 
JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Feb. 23, 1994, at IB; Elaine Williams, Lewiston Schools Consider Policy 
on Guest Speakers, LEWISTON MORNING TRIBUNE, Dec. 13, 1992, at 2C. 
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whether local police should be called in. The school always provides for a 
question-and-answer session after each speech. Result: Perhaps because of 
its very low budget for bringing in outside speakers, College A has not 
experienced a significant speech controversy in the past twenty years.88 
College B is a private coed school with no written policy on outside 
speakers. They are brought in by three groups: student clubs (usually in 
conjunction with academic departments), an office of public events, or the 
student government association. The school uses a generic hiring contract, 
budgeting no more than three thousand dollars for each speaker. Proposals 
are passed on, respectively, by the director of student activities, the vice-
president of the college, and the dean of students. If the issue being 
addressed is controversial, speakers with opposing viewpoints are sought or 
counter-demonstrations encouraged. Result: Although security 
arrangements would probably be a greater concern at College B, it too has 
not had a controversial speaker on campus in many years.89 
College C is a state-run liberal-arts school, which considers itself to 
be open to all kinds of speakers, regardless of the nature of their speech. 
Funding may come from the office of student development, academic 
departments, the student government association (which has a lectures 
committee), or the department of lectures and fine arts, which any student 
can petition to invite a speaker. If a situation would arise where a 
suggested speaker's appearance was likely to cause turmoil, the director of 
student development would confer with the dean of student affairs, who 
might present the question to the college president and others. Result: 
College C has never had to use any type of security for a visiting speaker.90 
At University A, a prestigious private institution, most speakers are 
brought to campus by student clubs or academic departments, at relatively 
low cost. Each fall the university sponsors a major and widely advertised 
month-long symposium on a topic of current interest. The symposium is 
organized by students, who invite from five to eight speakers to participate. 
Every speaker has to have a contract, either one of his/her own or the form 
contract supplied by the university. All speakers must ultimately be 
approved by the director of student activities. If the speaker is 
controversial, the school will decide whether it can afford the necessary 
security. If it cannot, the speaker doesn't come. University A has never 
88. Recently some students painted graffiti with soap to protest a speaker. It was quietly 
cleaned up by housekeeping. 
89. Hillary Clinton spoke on campus a year or so ago, but the first Lady brought her own 
security. 
90. Normally such students have already gone to the Student Development Office and been 
rejected. Consider, however, that College C is in a rural area and has only about 1400 students. 
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canceled a speaker due to the nature of his/her speech. Its only 
considerations appear to be the cost of security. Controversial speakers 
appear at University A with some frequency, and student protests are not 
uncommon. The director of student activities meets with complaining 
students to discuss ramifications of their disaffection. He may consult with 
the dean of students. He often suggests post-program discussion groupS.91 
University B is one of the state's flagship schools, a major research 
facility located just outside a large city. Speakers are brought to campus by 
student clubs, academic departments, and a lectures committee of the 
student events board. The lectures committee uses student activity fees to 
pay speakers. Its funds are limited, so usually the topic of the proposed 
speech becomes more important than the speaker, especially in view of the 
fact that bigger-name speakers, including those with some notoriety, are 
more expensive. Any issues involving a controversial speaker's 
appearance on campus would initially be discussed within the student 
events board, with the director of student activities next, and finally, the 
vice president for student affairs.92 
Neither of the major universities have firm policies dealing with the 
multifarious exigencies occasioned by controversial speakers, perhaps 
because all events differ according to context: the tenor of the times, 
nature of the forum, current tensions on campus, and the size and makeup 
of the student body. Some, like Howard University in the wake of its 
traumatic experiences with Khalid Muhammad, are struggling with how to 
handle similar conflicts in the future. All wish to honor the noble 
American tradition of free speech, but few are certain about making the 
difficult decisions on who should bear the cost of additional security when 
it is deemed necessary. 
91. The university does not typically look for public assistance with security, although its 
special events office, which sometimes brings in heads of states, almost always uses local police 
to help. One of the most controversial recent speakers was Leonard Jeffries, a black supremacist 
who is widely known for his anti-Semitic remarks. The Director of Student Activities organized 
post-program events. There were some peaceful protests during the speech. 
92. The most recent controversial speaker at University B was Johnny Cochran, the lead 
defense attorney in the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Cochran's contract required that he be 
provided with a certain amount of security, which was supplied by a private security agency hired 
by the Director of Student Activities. 
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III. LIBERTIES AND LIMITATIONS: THE CONSTITUTION ON 
CAMPUS 
A. PRINCIPLES OF FREE SPEECH 
"[T]he best test of truth," said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.,,93 This axiom can be proven only where freedom of expression, 
which may be the central characteristic of a democratic society based on 
popular self-governance, is unfettered. Such a liberty also serves to 
promote flexibility in the growth and development of a democracy by 
allowing for reasoned dialogue, and to maintain a healthy balance between 
stability and change.94 The university should both encourage that dialogue 
and seek that balance. 
The traditional view of the First Amendment's guarantee of free 
speech as virtually absolute, allowing few and narrow exceptions, reflects 
the Founding Fathers' dedication to an open and vigorous exchange of 
ideas. The theory is that those thoughts that are abhorrent to a free society, 
goes the argument, will fester if suppressed but wither when aired. 
Moreover, who is to decide which ideas are offensive? "'Freedom of 
speech is so precious and delicate a liberty that it must be preserved at great 
cost: Thus the depth of conviction in Voltaire's oft-quoted declaration, 'I 
disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say 
it. ",95 
But the First Amendment is not absolute. Indeed, the carefully carved 
exceptions to the rule of free speech (among them obscenity, defamation, 
and fighting words), and the recognition that speech can be constitutionally 
regulated by time, place, and manner restrictions, are all based on the 
understanding that the First Amendment was never intended to protect all 
utterances. Merely because it may be difficult to draw a line between 
acceptable and nonacceptable expression, or to allocate responsibility for 
deciding what speech to restrict, does not justify an absolutist approach. 
In recent years there has been growing support for yet another 
exception: the control of group defamation.96 Although an effort in this 
93. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
94. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-
79 (1963). 
95. Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 11, 12 (1985). 
96. See Scelfo v. Rutgers Univ. 282 A.2d 445,448 (N.J. 1971) ("The court in reaching its 
decision enunciated certain rules regarding group defamation"). 
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direction has been made on college and university campuses by way of 
speech and conduct codes, most of them have been too broadly drawn to 
pass constitutional muster.97 Nevertheless, some goals of such codes, civil 
discourse, reasoned debate, and the exclusion of unbridled hate speech (that 
which is uttered without possibility of immediate challenge), are entirely 
defensible if not fundamental to the academic enterprise. 
To what extent can a university constitutionally limit speech? 
1. Forum Analysis 
The rights and responsibilities of a public university toward outside 
speakers must be analyzed according to the institution's status as a forum, 
because the degree of protection for the speaker depends upon whether the 
forum is (a) traditionally public, (b) public pursuant to governmental 
designation, or ( c) non public. Traditional public forums, which generally 
include "streets and parks," require that the speaker be accorded full First 
Amendment rightS.98 On the campus of a public university, surrounding 
streets and sidewalks or open quadrangle areas may be considered 
traditional forums.99 Free speech is also guaranteed in non-traditional 
public forums (sometimes called "limited public forums"), that is, places 
made public by specific governmental designation. They have been 
characterized as either "property that the State has opened for expressive 
activity by all or part of the public" or a place or channel of communication 
for use by the public at large for assembly and speech for use by certain 
speakers or for the discussion of certain subjects. loo 
Speech in non-public forums, on the other hand, may be limited, if the 
disqualification or cancellation is viewpoint-neutral and otherwise 
reasonable in light of the purpose of the property.101 Largely in light of the 
Supreme Court's recent holding in Arkansas Educational Television 
Comm 'n v Forbes, 102 a public university's auditorium is likely to qualify as 
a non-public forum. The state has not created a designated public forum, 
said the Court, when it has done little more "than reserve eligibility for 
97. See Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds and 
Manners, 63 TENN. LAW REv. 689, 727 (1996). 
98. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-81 
(1992). 
99. See David F. McGowan and Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University 
Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REv. 825, 914 (1991). 
100. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (quoting 
International SOCiety, 505 U.S. 672, 678). 
101. See id. at 677-78 (internal citation omitted). 
102. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
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access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must 
then, as individuals, obtain permission to use it.,,103 
However, the case of Forbes, a 6-3 decision which involved a public 
television station's exclusion of a state congressional candidate from a 
televised debate, made it clear that even a non-traditional public forum 
should be made "'generally available' to a class of speakers.,,104 The 
debate in Forbes was held to have been in a nonpublic forum because it 
"did not have an open-microphone fonnat.,,105 The logistics of holding an 
electoral debate required the station to choose from a limited list of 
speakers and to allow them all to speak on one occasion.106 The Court 
noted that stations faced with the prospect of having to accommodate every 
candidate, regardless of viability, might eliminate debates altogether.107 
Forbes' exclusion was because of his lack of voter support and not his 
viewpoint. Moreover, his rejection was otherwise reasonable, that is, not 
intended as a manipulation of the political process, and thus 
constitutional. 108 
Forbes should not be interpreted, therefore, as giving public 
universities the right to cancel controversial speakers at will. Unlike public 
television stations, public universities often choose speakers from 
catalogues provided by speakers' bureaus, with hundreds of speakers to 
choose from, and need accommodate no more than one at a time. 
Moreover, it could well be argued that public universities have a greater 
responsibility to provide diverse viewpoints than does a public television 
station. 109 
Indeed, such was the view of the dissenters in Forbes, who pointed 
out that the station had no "narrow, objective and definite standards" upon 
which to base its decision. llo They agreed with the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion, that the station's appraisal of "political viability" was "so 
subjective, so arguable, so susceptible of variation in individual opinion, as 
to provide no secure basis for the exercise of governmental power 
consistent with the First Amendment."ll1 This failure to articulate an 
103. !d. at 679. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
104. Id at 678 (internal citation omitted). 
105. Id at 680. 
106. See id at 681. 
107. See id. 
108. See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1983) 
(holding that there was no evidence that the school district's internal mail system was not a 
designated public forum, though selected speakers were able to gain access to it). 
109. See discussion below on academic freedom, including the students' right to know. 
110. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 693. 
Ill. Id at 686 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter J., and Ginsburg J., dissenting) (quoting Forbes 
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objective standard might be scrutinized more closely if the state actor were 
a public university. Even if a university's auditorium qualifies as a non-
public forum, the utterances of a guest speaker cannot be limited unless 
they (a) fall into a category of unprotected speech (that is, they can be 
viewed as fighting words, obscene, or defamatory, or they create a clear 
and present danger); (b) are limited by reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions; or (c) cause a substantial interference with the school's 
educational mission. 
At least for students, a public university campus possesses many of 
the characteristics of a public forum. Denial of student access to forums 
for exchanging ideas would limit participation in the intellectual give-and-
take of campus debate. Public students thus enjoy the rights of free speech 
and association on campus, and any restriction of those rights is subject to 
strict scrutiny as a prior restraint. 
The First Amendment rights of students were clearly articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dis!., 112 
in which the Supreme Court held that black armbands worn by high school 
pupils in protest of the war in Vietnam constituted a peaceful expression of 
political opinion protected by the First Amendment. 113 Student speech can 
be limited, said the Court, only where it has been determined that it 
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion 
of the rights of others.,,114 
The Supreme Court has also established that students have a 
constitutional "right to receive ideas;"lIs to associate freely;1I6 and "to 
v. Arkansas Educ. Telecomm. Network Found., 93 F.3d 497,505 (8th Cir. 1996». 
112. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
113. See id. at 514. 
114. Id. at 513 (internal citation omitted); see also Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,749 (5th 
Cir. 1966) (public high school regulation prohibiting students from wearing buttons displaying 
political messages, absent any disruption of student activities, was unconstitutional); see 
generally Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also West Virginia State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding unconstitutional a school board resolution 
which required all teachers and pupils to participate in the flag salute); Hammond v. South 
Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 950 (D.C. S.C. 1967) (college rule prohibiting parades, 
celebrations and demonstrations without prior approval of college authorities was a prior restraint 
on students' speech and assembly rights which violated First Amendment). 
115. Board. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982); see generally Minarcini v. 
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 1976) (decided six years earlier but 
using Pico 's reasoning). 
116. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972), in which the Court held that a state 
college's refusal to recognize Students for a Democratic Society, a radical organization which 
sometimes resorted to violence, violated the members' associational and speech rights. Neither 
the school's disapproval of the group's philosophy, its failure to affirmatively deny the possibility 
that they might resort to violence, mere threat of disorder, could support state abridgment of the 
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inquire, to study, and to evaluate."lI7 School boards may not remove books 
from school library shelves in an attempt to insure political, religious or 
other orthodoxy.1I8 "[S]tudents may not be regarded as closed-circuit 
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate ... 
[S]chool officials cannot suppress 'expressions of feeling with which they 
do not wish to contend."119 They must "always remain free to inquire, to 
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding.,,12o 
The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of whether a public 
university may permissibly deny access to its facilities by a student 
religious group. One particular university, which previously allowed a 
religious group to conduct meetings on campus for several years, changed 
its policy when informing students that religious gatherings violated a 
regulation that prohibited the use of school "buildings or grounds for 
purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.,,121 The Court held that 
the new regulation violated the First Amendment because it prohibited the 
content of religious speech without demonstrating a compelling 
governmental interest to do so. The university had created a limited open 
forum for the use of student groups, and therefore bore "a heavy burden of 
justify[ing],,122 the exclusion of particular groupS.123 
The Court went out of its way, however, to distinguish university 
settings from traditional public forums like streets and parks. Decisions 
regarding how best to allocate scarce resources and to fulfill the underlying 
educational mission are entitled to deference. A university should not be 
required, for example, to provide equal campus access to students and non-
rights at issue. ld. at 183. 
117. Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 603. 
118. See Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 880. Justice Blackmun, concurring, said that requiring a school 
board to justify its removal of a book with more than its mere dislike is a narrow principle, since 
"[s]chool officials must be able to choose one book over another ... when the first book is 
deemed more relevant to the curriculum, or better written, or when one of a host of other 
politically neutral reasons is present." ld. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices 
Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, noted that the court had never previously recognized a 
student's right to receive knowledge from school library books. See id. at 888. He noted that the 
plurality's decision placed an unprecedented responsibility on the government to affIrmatively 
provide the ideas in question at a particular place. See id. In his dissent, Justice Powell noted that 
the right in question was unprecedented and would allow students to regularly overrule decisions 
made by school boards. See id. at 893, 897 (attaching an appendix to his opinion in which he 
quotes numerous passages from the banned books which would be considered "obscene" or 
''vulgar''). 
119. ld. at 868 (internal citation omitted). 
120. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (internal citation omitted). 
121. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981). 
122. Id. at 268. 
123. See id. at 277. 
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students. More recently, however, the Court struck down a state university 
regulation that denied funding to a student religious group to pay the 
printing costs of its publications, holding that the rule amounted to an 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.124 Other forms of protected 
expression on college campuses, such as the construction of symbolic 
shanty towns, have been recognized in the lower courts. 125 Likewise, 
denial of funding to gay student groups has been held to violate the First 
Amendment. 126 
The constitutional standards are also higher for universities than for 
high schools. This rule has been established in a long line of cases which 
have noted that elementary and secondary schools, unlike universities, are 
designed for the "selective conveyance of ideas" and not places for "free-
wheeling inquiry.,,127 Nevertheless, a number of lower courts have dealt 
124. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) 
(distinguishing between "content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the 
purposes of [a] limited forum, and... viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed 
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations."). Id. 
A federal court in Virginia addressed the issue of whether a state university, pursuant to a 
regulation barring organizations that have "special interests in religious, political, and social 
activities," could deny recognition of a student chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. 
See American Civil Liberties Union of Va, Inc. v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 894-95 n.1 
(W.O. Va 1970). Non-recognition of a group did not absolutely preclude the group's use of 
university facilities, but recognition guaranteed such use. The court held that the university was 
compelled to grant the same recognition to the ACLU group that it had previously given other 
political student organizations. See id. at 896-97. This case illustrates the importance of 
university regulations (and/or litigation) that clearly enunciate educational goals and objectives to 
be achieved or impaired by restricting on-campus speech. 
125. Shanty towns have been recognized as protected forms of speech on college campuses, 
subject to reasonable TPM restrictions. See Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 
F. Supp. 333, 337, 340 (W.O. Va 1987) (citing University of Utah Student Against Apartheid v. 
Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1211 (D. Utah 1986), which held that erection of shanties was First 
Amendment protected symbolic speech, but that the university requirement that they be removed 
at night in the interests of campus safety was a reasonable time, place and manner restriction; and 
holding that UV A's lawn use regulations precluding shanty construction, a form of symbolic 
speech protected by the First Amendment, did not meet the 0 'Brien standard). 
126. See Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that ''the [Gay and Lesbian Students Association] does not advocate sodomy, and, even if it did, 
its speech about an illegal activity would still be protected by the First Amendment. People may 
extol the virtues of arson or even cannibalism. They simply may not commit the acts.") [d. 
Consider, however, that the quoted passage may overstate the law: Extolling the virtues of arson 
may cause a material disruption, or create a clear and present danger that a listener will follow the 
speaker's advice. 
127. Pico, 457 U.S. at 915; (Rehnquist, J.,joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, J., dissenting); 
see Cary v. Board of Education of the Adams-Arapahoe Sch. Dist. 28-J, 598 F.2d 535, 539-540 
(10th Cir. 1979) (noting that most of the Supreme Court cases on academic freedom involve 
institutions of higher learning, distinguishing the Court's opinions on secondary schools); 
Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971) (noting that speech rights of 
secondary school teachers are probably less than those of university professors, that secondary 
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with secondary-school regulations requiring review of all non-school 
publications prior to their distribution on campus, most of which have been 
struck down as unconstitutional prior restraints. 128 But a student's right to 
free expression is far from absolute. An otherwise protected speech which 
interferes with the inculcation of "fundamental values," even if it is not 
physically disruptive, may nevertheless be prohibited. 129 Similarly, the 
state may limit the exposure of minors to speech which is indecent but not 
necessarily obscene. 130 
Likewise, a state university may deny recognition to a socialist 
student organization upon finding the group advocated the overthrow of 
established institutions by violent methods. I3I A Florida court upheld a 
university'S denial of recognition, stating the university presented ample 
evidence that recognition would threaten the school's educational goals and 
"constituted an imminently present threat" to order on campus.I32 The 
court further stressed that the administration's findings were neither vague 
nor indirect, but were based on documented evidence that the national 
socialist organization seeking university recognition advocated violent 
disruption as a way to achieve its goals.133 
school acts in loco parentis, and that secondary teachers are usually less educated and often less 
mature than professors); but see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 521-22 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (implying that there is no distinction between the rights 
of college students and students below the college level in state-run schools, and that the state has 
broad power to limit the rights of both; and citing Waugh v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of 
Mississippi, 237 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1915) in which the Court held constitutional a state law 
barring students from peaceably assembling in Greek letter fraternities.); see also Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 285-288 (1988) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and 
Blackrnun, J., dissenting) (implying that the First Amendment rights of high school students are 
virtually the same as those of college students or even adults). 
128. See Bright v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 556 P.2d 1090, 1100 (Cal. 1976); see 
generally In re Jordan, 500 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1972); Morris v. Williams, 433 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1967) 
(en banc). 
129. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding that a high 
school student's suspension, caused by his use of graphic sexual metaphor in a nominating speech 
made before the school body did not violate his First Amendment rights). 
130. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870 (in which all members of the Court recognized that the school 
board had authority to remove books that were vulgar); see also Thomas v. Board of Educ., 
Granville Central Sch. Dist., 607 F2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that "the First 
Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not 
Cohen's jacket"); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 
(1978) (stating "[a]lthough Cohen's written message might have been incomprehensible to a first 
grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant.) Id.; Ginsberg 
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968) (upholding a New York statute which banned the sale of 
sexuality oriented material to minors). 
131. See Merkey v. Board of Regents, 344 F. Supp. 1296, 1307 (N.D. Fla. 1972). 
132. See id. &t 1306. 
133. See id. at 1302. 
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Students' expressive rights have been similarly limited in school 
newspaper cases. The Supreme court has stated that a principal's refusal to 
allow two articles to be published in a high school paper did not violate the 
First Amendment because the paper was a nonpublic forum, which "might 
be reasonably perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school,,134 and 
therefore subjected to a standard "reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concems.,,135 
Faculty members have similar limitations. For example, a professor 
who sued the University of Massachusetts for ordering his controversial art 
display to be removed from the student union building was not allowed to 
claim First Amendment protection. The exhibit included detailed nude 
paintings with controversial titles, including paintings of nude adolescents. 
A federal appeals court rejected the plaintiff's claim that his art constituted 
political or social speech: Plaintiff's constitutional interest was held to be 
minimal in that "freedom of speech must recognize, at least within limits, 
freedom not to listen.,,136 
Outsiders seeking a forum on campus operate under similar rules. 
134. Hazlewood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
135. Id at 273. Note that this is similar to the standard applied in cases involving the First 
Amendment rights of prisoners, where the current test is whether the speech is "reasonably 
related to legitimate penological concerns." Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1986); 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989). In Hazelwood, Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, wrote a noteworthy dissent, in which he argued that Tinker's 
"material disruption" standard was appropriate in this case, and that the principal's actions failed 
that standard. Student expression, said Brennan, is bound to conflict with the state's pedagogical 
functions, but that "mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message" was not 
constitutionally sufficient justification for the suppression of student speech. Brennan further 
noted that the Court has never intimated a distinction between personal and school-sponsored 
speech. See Hazlewood, 484 U.S. at 280-82 (citing Papish v. University of Missouri Board of 
Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671 n.l (1973) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional a University's 
expUlsion of a student for lewd expression in an off-campus newspaper she sold on-campus 
pursuant to university authorization»; see also Healy, 408 U.S. at 195-196. However, both 
Papish and Healy involved speech on college campuses. 
The distinction between non-school-sponsored student speech and that which may bear the 
school's "imprimatur" was used to uphold a high-school principal's decision to abandon the 
school's "Johnny Reb" mascot in Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that a principal was justified in eliminating a "Johnny Reb" mascot, after receiving 
complaints that black students and parents found it offensive); see Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 
1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (striking down a school regulation requiring submission and approval of 
non-school sponsored publications before they could be distributed on campus in). 
136. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988,989-91 (1970); 400 U.S. 903 (1970) cert. denied. Close 
may be distinguished from other free-speech cases in that the people viewing the artwork 
probably did not come to the forum for that purpose, and therefore would not have wanted to 
view it if given the choice. Further, the rights of involuntary viewers to be protected from this 
"offensive" material superseded a faculty member's right to express himself on campus, even 
though he had been invited to do so by an official. 
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Thus, extracurricular organizations, such as the ACLU, have been granted 
standing to assert the right of its student members to form a chapter on a 
college campus. "[W]hile it might be constitutional for a state university to 
deny use of its facilities to all outside speakers, it is clearly unconstitutional 
to allow some outside speakers to use facilities but to deny their use to 
speakers who are controversial or considered undesirable by the college 
administration, board of trustees, or state legislature.,,137 Just as students 
and faculty at public universities do not enjoy an absolute right to free 
expression, regardless of the consequences of certain speech, university 
officials do not have absolute power to arbitrarily censor on-campus speech 
by outside speakers. 138 
Although it is not likely that a public university would adopt a policy 
of disallowing all outside speakers from speaking on campus, if such a 
policy is deemed best for the institution's educational goals, it can 
constitutionally do so. On the other hand, public universities cannot allow 
some outside speakers and disallow others without a narrowly drawn 
justification, as such a practice is deemed an unconstitutional prior restraint 
on the right of students and faculty to hear certain speakers. Such prior 
restraints on speech are presumed unconstitutional unless the restraint is 
"narrowly drafted so as to suppress only that speech which presents a 'clear 
and present danger' of resulting in serious substantive evil which a 
university has the right to prevent.,,139 
An unconstitutional prior restraint was found when a university barred 
the guest of a recognized student group to speak on campus because he 
might advocate breaking the law and because he was a convicted felon. 140 
The university had no official outside speaker regulations in effect at the 
time, and the president based his decision on merely a "philosophical 
concept." The court ruled that the principal's decision was "blatant 
political censorship," and that his guidelines constituted unconstitutional 
prior restraints on speech.141 Similarly, a college administrator's attempt to 
137. American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc, v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 
896 (W.D. Va 1970). 
138. See Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 970 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (invalidating 
unconstitutionally vague outside speaker regulations applicable to all universities in the State of 
Mississippi ). 
139. Id. at 971 (internal citation omitted). The "clear and present danger test," first enunciated 
by the Supreme Court in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927), is satisfied only where 
a proper authority finds that "immediate serious violence (or other substantive evil) was to be 
expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such 
advocacy was then contemplated." Id. 
140. See Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188, 191 (M.D. Ala. 1969). 
141. Id at 188, 191, 196. The court also held that Auburn could not allocate funds to pay 
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sanction a student/faculty organization for inviting controversial speakers 
to campus was struck down. The court held the president's conclusion that 
the speakers' militant views "would be apt to exacerbate the tensions 
between the College and the community [and to] provoke discussions 
between students" was insufficient to quell the speech at issue. 142 Fear of 
campus disturbances is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression, since many types of discussions among students can cause 
disruptions.143 
In determining whether a university is to be considered public or 
private, courts are also called upon to decide whether its actions are fairly 
attributable to the state. l44 Because private universities are generally not 
considered state actors, they are held to a lower standard of constitutional 
scrutiny and a lesser obligation to ensure a student's First Amendment 
rights. 145 The Supreme Court first recognized this proposition in Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn,146 in which a teacher at a private school for socially-
maladjusted high school students had been discharged after supporting a 
student petition for greater participation in decision-making. Five other 
teachers who complained about their colleague's dismissal were likewise 
discharged. All six filed claims alleging violations of their rights under the 
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that even though 
the school received public funds and performed a public function, its 
some speakers, then withhold payment for other speakers without constitutional justification. See 
id. at 198. See also Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1519 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (intimating that the defendant university which refused to allow "The Last Temptation 
of Christ" to be screened on campus was likely to lose on the merits). For an exhaustive analysis 
of outside publication cases, see Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1152-59 (1987). 
142. Pickings v. Bruce, 430 F.2d 595,600 (8th Cir. 1970). 
143. See id. 
144. See Frank 1. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional 
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 306 (1989). 
Id. 
[T]he [state action] doctrine holds that although someone may have suffered harmful 
treatment of a kind that one might ordinarily describe as a deprivation of liberty or a 
denial of equal protection of the laws, that occurrence excites no constitutional 
concern unless the proximate active perpetrators of the harm include persons 
exercising the special authority or power of the government of a state. 
145. See Evan G. S. Siegel, Comments, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The 
Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1382-1387 
(1990). 
146. 457 U.S. 830 (1982); see generally Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (determining 
that a private nursing home was not a state actor despite being heavily funded and regulated by 
the state); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil. Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (recognizing that the party 
charged with a constitutional deprivation must be fairly characterized as a state actor.) 
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discharge of the teacher was not the result of any state regulation and must 
therefore be honored. The private school's relationship with the state was 
likened to that of a private contractor and its client: There is no "symbiotic 
relationship" between the two. 147 
In order for constitutional rights to be asserted against a private 
university, a showing must be made that "state action" is involved.148 The 
mere fact that a private university'S mission may be to educate members of 
the public does not by itself fulfill this function. Absent state action, a 
university may regulate speech as it sees fit because constitutional rights 
can only be infringed by the government.149 Generally, state action is 
found where three conditions occur: (1) the state and the private entity 
maintain an interdependent relationship; (2) the state requires, encourages, 
or is otherwise significantly involved in nominally private conduct; and (3) 
the private entity exercises a traditional state function. Governmental 
regulation of a private college, or even substantial contribution of financial 
support, does not alone constitute state action. 
Unfortunately, courts have been neither clear nor uniform in the 
distinctions they draw between private and public universities. For 
example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that although Princeton 
University is a private institution, it could still be obligated to protect free 
speech. Princeton had sought to evict someone from its campus for 
distributing political literature without a permit. The court held that the 
state constitution, which expressly forbade government from abridging the 
right of speech and assembly, should be applied to private universities 
147. Some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court modified its holding in 
Rendell-Baker with its subsequent ruling in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 
(1983), which suggests that "private colleges, like private persons, are always free to advocate or 
endorse heinous doctrines, even if they are contrary to contemporary morality or constitutional 
law." William Shaun Alexander, Regulating Speech on Campus: A Plea/or Tolerance, 26 WAKE 
FOREST L. REv. 1349, 1362 (1991). But Bob Jones says no such thing, holding simply that the 
Establishment Clause has not been violated when tax benefits granted to a religious university are 
withheld because the institution failed to observe the "fundamental public policy" of non-
discrimination as required by federal statute (even if its actions were taken pursuant to religious 
belie!). While this holding might appear to characterize the school's discriminatory practices as 
government related, the words "state action" are never mentioned in the case. Moreover, Bob 
Jones is otherwise too distinguishable to be treated as a modification of Rendell-Baker: There was 
no speech issue raised; the school's actions were clearly covered by a federal statute, as 
interpreted by an IRS Revenue Ruling in spite of the institution's private status; and the Court, if 
it had found for the university, would have been undermining its oft-articulated position that 
equal treatment of all races is fundamental public policy. See generally Bob Jones 461 U.S. 574 
(1983). 
148. See Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598, 607-08 (D. S.C. 1970). 
149. See Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 656 F. Supp. 1045, 1051 (W.O. Ark. 
1987). 
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through the state's police power. It thus found that Princeton's permit 
regulation was unconstitutional, in that it was not based on any specific 
standards at the university for limiting expression.150 Further, the court 
noted that because the mission of both private and public universities is the 
same- education- a wide disparity in expressive freedoms between the two 
types of colleges "would seem anomalous and undesirable." Thus, it 
concluded, "the differences between public and private educational 
institutions may, in many situations, be negligible.,,151 
The activities of private universities may likewise be considered state 
action if the federal or state government is heavily involved in subsidizing 
or running the institution. For example, when a group of employees 
maintained that Temple University, an otherwise private university, had 
violated their civil rights by wrongfully terminating them, the District 
Court found state action on the part of the university because of its intimate 
relationship with governmental entities. Although a university does not 
become a state actor merely because it has a charter from the state, Temple 
University was incorporated by statute into the Pennsylvania education 
system, there were state-appointed members on Temple's board of trustees, 
and the university received significant state subsidies. 152 
An argument can also be made that a private institution may become a 
state actor if it performs some public function or opens the campus to the 
public. By inviting the public to attend concerts, lectures, films and 
sporting events, the private university creates a public forum, where First 
Amendment freedoms are protected. "The more an owner, for his 
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more 
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional 
150. See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 632-33 (N.J. 1980). The Schmid case contains a 
thorough analysis of other cases pertaining to constitutional freedoms and private property in 
general. 
151. The Court stated that although Princeton 
/d. at 621. 
is involved in a continuous relationship with the State ... [it] is a state-
accredited educational institution; it participates in and receives... the 
advantages of certain State programs . .. Its property and buildings on the 
central campus with the exception of its ice skating and hockey facility and 
its campus parking lots, are tax-exempt. [It] also receives state-budgeted 
funds ... [It] is, indisputably, predominantly private, unregulated and 
autonomous in its character and functioning as an institution of higher 
education. 
152. See Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
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rights of those who use it.,,153 
In 1991 Congress attempted to enable private university students to 
obtain injunctive relief if the school "[made] or [enforced] any rule 
subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely on the basis of 
conduct that is speech or other communication protected [by the First 
Amendment].,,154 The Collegiate Speech Protection Act, which was 
endorsed by the American Civil Liberties Union, would have allowed 
students at private educational institutions receiving federal funds to 
challenge campus conduct codes on First Amendment grounds. The bill 
did not pass. ISS 
Public schools, in contrast, are viewed with considerably more 
stringent constitutional scrutiny. 156 They must abide by three general 
principles of free speech. First, speech cannot be banned because of its 
content. 157 Second, even the expression of odious ideas must be 
protected. 158 And third, the academic setting presupposes a heightened 
commitment to First Amendment principles.159 Thus on a state university 
campus, the mere dissemination of ideas, no matter how offensive to good 
153. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). 
154. See William Kimsey, Fighting Restrictive Codes on Campus, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 13, 
1992, at E4. 
155. See Hyde and Fishman, supra note 15, at 1493. The legislation would have provided the 
following: 
(a) A postsecondary educational institution that is a program or activity shall not 
make or enforce any rule subjecting any student to disciplinary sanctions solely 
on the basis of conduct that is speech or other communication protected from 
governmental restriction by the first article of amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States; (b) Whoever is a student at an educational institution engaged 
in a violation of subsection (a) may, in a civil action, obtain appropriate 
injunctive and declaratory relief ... (c) This section does not apply to an 
educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent 
that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious 
tenets of such organization. 
fd. at 1493-94. In 1992 the California legislature amended the state's education code to guarantee 
students the same First Amendment rights on campus that they have elsewhere. CAL. EDUC. 
CODE § 94367 (West 1992). The law applies to public and private colleges and universities, with 
a narrow exception for schools operated by religious denominations. Students can sue for 
infringement of their free speech rights. Civil recovery is limited to court costs and attorney's 
fees. This section has been upheld in various cases involving California State University, 
Northridge, Occidental College, and Stanford University. 
156. See infra Section II.C. 
157. See Police Dept' of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
158. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24-25 
(1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969); see also Stephen W. Gard, Fighting 
Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 547-48 (1980). 
159. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). 
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taste, "may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of 
decency.",160 The university is generally in a better position if it has an 
established policy against unprotected categories of speech, rather than 
having to attack them on an ad hoc basis. 
2. Unprotected Utterances 
To issue a prior restraint, that is, to cancel a speech before it is 
delivered, a public university must show that a breach of the peace is 
virtually certain to occur by virtue of the speaker's advocacy of violence. 161 
Past instances of violence associated with a particular speaker may also 
justify a cancellation. Generally, however, a public university would have 
to wait until the inflammatory words have been uttered and have been 
determined to create a clear and present danger or a substantial threat that 
violence will ensue. 162 
Regulation of expression that incites imminent lawless action is 
permissible. The Supreme Court has drawn the distinction between "mere 
advocacy," for which the government cannot punish, and inciting a group 
to violence, which it can constitutionally limit.163 But the Court has strictly 
interpreted this standard, requiring a careful consideration of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding such expression. Thus, universities must 
narrowly tailor policies to ensure that regulation prohibits only imminent, 
unlawful incitement to action, the definition and application of which can 
be difficult. 164 
Even if a university has a constitutionally sound prohibition against 
"fighting words" (an improbable proposition), it would not be able to 
prevent a speaker from uttering insults at his audience. The Supreme Court 
has held that "fighting words," which "by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," are not communication 
but instruments of assault, and therefore are not entitled to First 
Amendment protection.165 Such words do not promote "any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
160. Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (refusing to 
suppress offensive words is a "central test" of commitment to free speech). 
161. Advocacy alone cannot be prohibited. See Brooks, 412 F.2d at 1173 (internal citation 
omitted). 
162. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); see also Healy, 408 U.S. at 192. 
163. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (1969). 
164. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407. 
165. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chap/ins/..y involved a 
defendant who was arrested after calling the city marshall a "[g]od damned racketeer" and a 
"damned [f]ascist." Id. at 569. 
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that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.,,166 But the Court has narrowly construed this 
doctrine. 167 
In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment does not protect statements which defame specific groupS.168 
Though the Court subsequently limited the group-libel exception when it 
decided that public officials had to prove actual malice in order to recover 
for libel, stating that First Amendment freedoms required such restrictions 
and underscoring the notion that political speech is to be protected under 
the First Amendment,169 it has never explicitly overruled Beauharnais. 
Group-libel should thus remain a viable action.170 Thus it is open to 
question whether broad university regulations that penalize group libel (for 
example, a prohibition on the distribution of racist or anti-Semitic 
publications) would be held unconstitutional as protected political speech. 
It is likewise well established that when the interest in prohibiting the 
expression outweighs the need for the speaker to disseminate his message, 
it may be limited by fairly applied time, place, and manner restrictions, 
provided that there is an alternative forum available and the regulation is 
content-neutral. l7l For example, if a controversial speaker was 
inadvertently scheduled to appear during a university's final examination 
period, in derogation of an established policy prohibiting such appearances 
at that time, cancellation of the speech would in all likelihood be 
166. Id. at 572; see Thomas F. Shea, Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That"-
Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1,22 (1975). The fighting-words doctrine, 
which requires that there be a "one-on-one, face-to-face" confrontation is arguably obsolete, since 
the Supreme Court hasn't upheld any laws prohibiting fighting words since Chaplinsky. See, e.g., 
Gooding, Warden v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that 
"the Court ... is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky."). 
167. See Punishing Racist Speech, I SYNTIffiSIS: L. AND POL'y IN HIGHER EDUC. 3 (1989). In 
some post-Chaplinsky cases, the Court has refused to classify the challenged speech as fighting 
words. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) and Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 
U.S. 564,567 (1970). In other cases where the doctrine was arguably applicable, the Court has 
reversed lower court decisions based on overbreadth of laws rather than for failure to meet the 
"fighting words" standard. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) and Gooding v. 
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971). 
168. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251, 266-67 (1952). 
169. See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377 (1992). 
170. See Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt 
In, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 77, 110 (1984). 
171. See Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d. 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1969); see generally 
University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986); 
Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969). (stating that the court "[sees] no 
objection to the university's requirement that preference be given to an academic event over an 
invitation to a guest speaker sought to be scheduled at the same time."). Id. 
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constitutional. l72 While speech itself cannot advocate violence, neither may 
it be silenced by those in the audience. The prohibition against a "heckler's 
veto," acceding to an audience's demand that the speaker be halted, is 
based on the generally-accepted presumption against attributing the 
creation of a "clear and present danger" to the speaker. 173 
But this principle appears to conflict with the "substantial interference 
doctrine;" perhaps the most concrete criterion upon which controversial 
speech on campus may be constitutionally regulated. This standard, first 
promulgated by the Fifth Circuit in Brooks v. Auburn University,174 
suggests that even if no clear and present danger could be demonstrated, a 
university might be able to cancel a speaker who is likely to create a 
"material disruption.,,175 Such a disruption may occur when a controversial 
speaker is shouted down, regardless of who (speaker or heckler) is silenced 
or ousted.176 
3. Speech Codes 
As noted earlier many universities, both public and private, have 
responded to the increasing amount of campus incivility by formulating 
speech and conduct codes.177 A typical code defines harassment to include 
any conduct, verbal or physical, on or off campus, which creates an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational, work, or living environment, 
and is premised on the ideas that (a) while freedom of expression is 
essential in a university, so is freedom from unreasonable and disruptive 
offense; and (b) it is usually easier to deal with such questions if one thinks 
172. The school would probably have to show that students did actually use the auditorium for 
studying, and it would probably have to arrange for him to speak at another site on campus, or 
reschedule his appearance at a later time. 
173. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). 
174. 412 F.2d 1171 (1969). 
175. Id at 1173; see Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488, 492-93 
(D.S.C. 1997) (holding that, based on "material disruption" standard, a middle school was 
justified in prohibiting student from wearing jacket made to look like a Confederate battle flag, in 
view of past disruptive incidents resulting from students wearing garments which depicted the 
Confederate flag); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976) (holding that school 
board's absolute prohibition of political speakers at a local high school was unreasonable where 
"no disruptions had occurred in [the teacher's] classes, or at any other school gatherings where 
political subjects were discussed" and "none were expected in the future.") Id. at 1364; but see 
Healy, 408 U.S. 169, 185, 190-91 (mere threat of disorder insufficient to justify university's 
refusal to enfranchise its SDS chapter). 
176. Under First Amendment jurisprudence, it would likely be required to silence the hecklers 
and allow the speaker to continue, provided that his speech is otherwise protected. 
177. One observer notes some 700 colleges and universities had enacted hate speech codes by 
1995. See Schweitzer, supra note 85, at 508 nA8. 
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in terms of interests rather than rights. 178 
The movement to enforce civility on campus has been called the most 
successful effort in American history to restrict offensive speech. 179 
Perhaps that is why universities promulgating such codes have been 
undeterred by the fact that not one of them has been found constitutional. 
Among the most notable university codes to be overturned to date have 
been those at three major universities: Michigan, Wisconsin and 
Stanford. 180 
The University of Michigan's policy was the first to go before the 
courts. The test case arose out of a series of racist incidents on campus in 
the winter of 1987, beginning with the distribution of racist pamphlets 
declaring "open season" on African-Americans, referring to them as 
"saucer lips, porch monkeys, andjigaboos." A week later some racist jokes 
were broadcast on the campus radio station. When students demonstrated 
against these incidents, a student displayed a Ku Klux Klan uniform from a 
dormitory window. The administration quickly took action in the form of a 
statement from the president of the university expressing outrage at the 
events, and reaffirming the University of Michigan's dedication to 
maintaining a racially, ethnically, and culturally diverse campus. The state 
legislature held a public hearing on racism. At the same time, students 
formed a "United Coalition Against Racism" and threatened to file a class-
action suit against the university for failing to maintain a nonracist 
environment on campus.181 
By the following spring, the University of Michigan's regents had 
adopted a student code of conduct. Its Policy on Discrimination and 
Discriminatory Harassmentl82 prohibited any behavior (verbal or physical) 
that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual for physical, racial, or social 
characteristics beyond his control. Such behavior would include any 
"express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts, employment, 
participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal 
safety; or .... [c ]reat[ing] an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning 
environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in 
University sponsored extra-curricular activities.,,183 
178. See, e.g., Stephen Fleischer, Campus Speech Codes: The Threat to Liberal Education, 27 
J. MARsH. L.R. 709, 738-48 (1994) (discussing affects ofcoIIegiate speech codes). 
179. See Lasson, supra note 97, at 733. 
180. See id at 727. 
181. See John Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
182. [d. 
183. [d. at 856. A black female law student called another student ''white trash" and was 
charged with violating the University of Michigan harassment rule. She ultinIately agreed to 
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Interestingly, the Michigan code divided the university into three 
speech zones: public areas, where only physical acts would be restricted; 
residence halls, where speech and conduct were governed by language in 
the room leases; and educational facilities (including libraries), where the 
university sought to regulate speech that discriminated "on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, ~reed, national origin, 
ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status."I84 
The university policy was challenged by a graduate student in 
biopsychology, who argued that it infringed on his freedom to teach; 
specifically, that it would hamper his discussion of the biological roots of 
individual differences in personality traits and mental abilities. He believed 
that some of the theories, because they espoused genetic and biological 
factors as major contributors to individual differences presented, could be 
perceived as sexist or racist under the code.18s 
In 1989, a federal judge struck down the Michigan policy as an 
unconstitutional restriction on free speech, finding it to be vague and 
overbroad because "the terms stigmatize and victimize are not self-
defining" and "can only be understood with reference to some exogenous 
value system.,,186 The court also took issue with the university in that its 
code sought to prohibit "certain speech because it disagreed with the ideas 
or messages sought to be conveyed. . . [It]was essentially making up the 
rules as it went along.,,187 In short, the university could not proscribe 
speech "simply because it was found to be offensive, even gravely so, by 
large numbers of people.,,188 The court commented further on the tension 
brought to bear in speech codes between free speech and equal protection, 
and making clear its feeling that the First Amendment took precedence 
over the Fourteenth.189 
Two years later, Wisconsin's speech code was likewise declared 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The policy covered "racist or 
discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior directed at 
an individual," where those comments "demean the race, sex, religion, 
color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age 
of the individual or individuals, "and" [c ]reate an intimidating, hostile or 
write a fonnal letter of apology to settle the charge. American Civil Liberties Union Briefing 
Paper Number 16 (1996) <http://www.achLol-glJibralyi}lbp16lrtml>. 
184. John Doe, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989); See MARcus, supra note 10, at 124. 
185. See John Doe at 858. 
186. ld. at 859. 
187. ld. at 868. 
188. ld at 863. 
189. See id. at 868. 
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demeaning environment for education, or other university-authorized 
activity. 190 The Wisconsin code was much clearer and more narrowly 
drafted than that of the University of Michigan. First, it applied only to 
direct attacks on an individual. Second, it included illustrative examples, 
such as calling someone an offensive name, placing demeaning material in 
someone's living quarters, and destroying property. Third, the university 
issued to students and faculty an explanatory pamphlet, including detailed 
classroom and non-classroom examples, applying the policy to the facts of 
each example, and concluding with whether the expression would be 
subject to the university's code. 191 
The Wisconsin code was applied in a number of specific incidents 
involving fraternities. A student who called another student "Shakazulu" 
was placed on probation, ordered to consult with an alcohol abuse 
counselor, and required to plan a project to help sensitize himself to the 
issue of diversity. A student was also placed on probation for 
impersonating an immigration official and demanding to see the 
immigration documents of a Turkish-American student. A student was 
placed on probation and required to get treatment for alcohol abuse for 
telling an Asian-American student that "[i]t's people like you that's the 
reason this country is screwed Up.,,192 A student was placed on probation 
and required to perform community service for yelling at a woman and 
calling her a "fucking bitch.,,193 Another student was suspended for calling 
a residence hall staffer a "South American immigrant.,,194 While it had 
been more carefully drafted than the Michigan policy, the Wisconsin code 
was nevertheless found unconstitutional195 The university, which was one 
of the first to ban racial and sexual slurs on campus, first attempted to 
redraw its code more narrowly, but later dropped in entirely in 1992.196 
Perhaps the most surprising code to fail was Stanford's, a set of rules 
which carefully sought to avoid any chilling effect on the debate of 
sensitive topics by forbidding only fighting words linked to sex and race. 
In 1988, after two white students defaced a poster at a black theme house 
with racial caricatures, Stanford had enacted a hate speech regulation which 
190. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of Wis. System, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 
1165 (E.D. Wis. 1991). 
191. See id at I 165-66. 
192. Id at 1167. 
193. Id. 
194. Id 
195. See id at 1177. 
196. See id 
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banned insults based on sex or race. 197 In 1994, ten students filed suit, 
claiming that Stanford's rule (entitled "Fundamental Standard 
Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment") violated 
the California Educational Code, the California Constitution, and the U.S. 
Constitution, arguing that it was a "content-based, view point 
discriminatory, prior restrahlt on speech." A lower state court agreed, on 
the grounds that the code inhibited free speech: "Stanford cannot proscribe 
speech that merely hurts the feelings of those who hear it.,,198 The ruling 
was the first time a speech code at a private university had been held 
invalid. 199 
B. NOTIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
1. Precepts 
The concept of academic freedom, a First Amendment subtext 
through which scholars generally invoke an enhanced notion of free-speech 
rights,200 can trace its history as far back as Plato's Apology, in which 
Socrates defended his right to discuss controversial topics with others, 
regardless of whether those in power may have found them unacceptable.201 
Yet even Socrates felt constrained by certain moral and religious principles, 
which were subsequently reflected in the curriculum of the great early 
197. See Bill Workman, Ban on Hate Speech Struck Down/Judge Rules Stanford Code is too 
Broad, San Francisco Chronicle, Chronicle Peninsula Bureau (Mar. 2, 1995) 
<http://joc.mit.eduldocslstanford.ban.struck.down.htm>. 
198. Ben Wildavsky, First Amendment vs. Anti-Hate Efforts: Rethinking Campus Speech 
Codes, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 4, 1995, at AI. Stanford's code had been crafted by 
Thomas Grey, a law professor highly sensitive to First Amendment principles. See id 
199. See id For a detailed summary of the speech code test cases at Michigan, Wisconsin, 
and Stanford, see MARcus, supra note 10, at 122-129. George Mason University's code is also 
discussed therein. 
200. This article primarily addresses the speech rights of outsiders who appear by invitation at 
public colIeges and universities. Some such speakers may simultaneously be employed as 
professors on other campuses. However it is not generally held that a professor's academic 
freedom at his home campus is carried with him whenever he appears elsewhere. For a more 
thorough treatment of this issue, see ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 35-36 (L. Joughin ed., 1969) 
(recognizing professors' rights to full freedom in research, in classroom teaching, and to speak or 
write outside the classroom free from censorship or discipline by their employing institution); see 
also Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. REV. 831 (1987); Steven R. 
Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They 
Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1976); and Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 
HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1968). 
201. See Irwin Polishook, Academic Freedom and Academic Contexts, 15 PACE L. REV. 141, 
142 (1994). 
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universities.202 For example, any dissent from the Articles of the Church of 
England was prohibited at Oxford and Cambridge.203 Similar limitations on 
academic freedom continued into the late nineteenth century, when 
professors at American colleges and universities were dismissed for such 
offenses as "advocated free trade and greenbacks," participating in a 
Populist convention, speaking out against monopolies, favoring free silver, 
opposing imperialism, and delivering a pro-labor speech.204 
A concerted effort to change the state of affairs came with the 
creation of the American Association of University Professors in 1915. 
"Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and 
not to further the interest of either the individual teacher . . . or the 
institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for 
truth and its free exposition." So begins the AAUP's fIrst Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.205 Academic freedom is 
deemed essential to these purposes, and applies to teaching, research, and 
learning. Tenure is a means to both freedom of teaching and research and 
to "a sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession 
attractive to men and women of ability.,,206 
SpecifIcally, academic freedom means that the teacher is entitled to 
full freedom in research and in the publication of its results, subject to the 
adequate performance of his other academic duties, as well as to freedom in 
the classroom in discussing his subject. "But {he] should be carefol not to 
introduce into {his] teaching controversial matter which has no relation to 
{his] subject.,,207 "Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or 
202. See id 
203. See id 
204. Id. at 143. 
205. \V ALTER METzGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN TIlE AGE OF TIlE UNIVERSITY, 146 (1955); 
see also Polishook, supra note 2021, at 142. A declaration on academic freedom was first 
endorsed by the AAUP at its Second Annual meeting in 1916. In 1940, representatives of the 
Association of American Colleges and the American Association of University professors agreed 
upon a "Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure," and upon three attached 
"Interpretations." The 1940 Statement, and its Interpretations, were endorsed by the two 
associations in 1941. In subsequent years endorsement has been officially voted by numerous 
other organizations. The 1990 edition of AAUP's Red Book lists 143 endorsers, including many 
professional disciplinary associations, as well as the Association of American Law Schools, the 
American Council of Learned Societies, and the American Association of Higher Education. 
206. American Association of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments <http://www.aaup.orglI940stat.htm>. 
207. See id at Academic Freedom (b )2 (emphasis supplied). As an AAUP editor's note points 
out, some courses of study require consideration of matter on which the teacher is not in all 
aspects expert; thus the teacher of English composition or literature may have to deal with 
writings about race relations, sexual mores, or social philosophy. A teacher handling mixed 
responsibilities of this type ordinarily indicates the limits of his expert judgment, and should not 
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other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time 
of the appointment. ,,208 
The college or university teacher is regarded as "a citizen, a member 
of a learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution." When 
speaking or writing, the teacher should thus be free from institutional 
censorship or discipline. But his special position in the community 
imposes special obligations. As a person of learning and an educational 
officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and 
his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, 
should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions 
of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not a 
spokesman for the institution.209 
Like the First Amendment, however, academic freedom is not 
absolute. This was recognized at length by the first Declaration of 
Principles in 1915, which provided that there are no rights without 
corresponding duties.210 The claim to freedom of teaching is made in the 
interest of the integrity and progress of scientific inquiry. The liberty of the 
scholar to set forth his conclusions is conditioned upon their being the 
fruits of "competent, patient and sincere inquiry," which are set forth with 
"dignity, courtesy, and temperateness oflanguage.,,211 While the university 
teacher need not withhold his own opinions in controversial matters, he 
should be a person of "fair and judicial mind," and offer "without 
suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions of other investigators.,,212 
A professor should cause his students "to become familiar with the best 
public expressions of the great historic types of doctrine upon the questions 
at issue.,,213 Above all, he should remember that his business is not to give 
students "ready-made conclusions, but to train them to think for 
themselves, and to provide them access to those materials which they need 
if they are to think intelligently."214 In short, there is a balance to strike 
be subject to particular scrutiny because he may deal with controversial issues. 
208. Problems sometimes arise through the failure of an institution to be explicit about its 
particular limitations at the time of appointing a teacher, or the failure of a teacher to observe 
limitations which he has accepted short of waiver of his fundamental academic obligations. Id. 
209. See ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF TIlE AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, supra note 200, at 36. An issue has also arisen 
regarding the right to silence or, conversely, the obligation of disclosure. 
210. See General Report of the Committee of Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure 
(1915), reprinted in 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 393 at 393, app. A401 (1990). 
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between the right of the individual to free speech and the right of others to 
be protected from it. Violations of such academic responsibilities by 
professors who do not state the truth as they see it, develop and improve 
their scholarly competence, exercise critical self-discipline and judgment in 
using and transmitting knowledge, and act as intellectual guides and 
counselors may be looked upon as abuses of academic freedom rather than 
its exercise. 
Academic freedom also forbids use of the classroom for political 
advocacy or indoctrination, for defamation, or in efforts to incite violence. 
A professor can be constrained from discussing material irrelevant to his 
assigned subject matter; from using abusive or profane language; from 
discriminating against students or colleagues on the basis of their race, 
religion, gender, or viewpoints; and from violating current standards of 
decency and civility.215 The more difficult cases of academic freedom 
involve incendiary speakers whose agenda are arguably motivated by 
bigotry and have little educational value. 
But under the standards articulated above, one would struggle to 
invoke academic freedom as a defense to the rantings of Khalid 
Muhammad. Nor, for that matter, would they seem to justifY questionable 
academic programs. For example, the conference on "Revolting Behavior" 
sponsored in 1997 by the State University of New York at New Paltz, 
which featured the sale of sex toys and instruction on sado-masochism and 
masturbation, might arguably be outside the protection of AAUP 
guidelines.216 
2. Jurisprudence 
As noted earlier, the leading case regarding academic freedom is 
Keyishian v. Board ojRegents,217 in which the Supreme Court declared: 
Our Nation is deeply conunitted to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of 
215. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND TIlE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 7 (1993). 
216. The conference also featured a presentation by a "performance artist" who dressed as a 
Hasidic Jew, was beaten with a whip, made to crawl on his hands and knees, during which he was 
subjected to an act of (simulated) sodomy. "[A]cademic freedom ... will not long last if it is spat 
upon in this fashion. The academy is supposed to be a refuge from ignorance and bigotry. 
[SUNY] has used a public trust to promote deviancy and lew-hatred." Anti-Semitism at New 
Paltz, N.Y. POST, Feb. 10, 1998, at 26. 
217. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools. .. The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace 
of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through 
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of 
authoritative selection.,,218 
83 
The Court later embellished upon its holding in Keyishian: ~'To 
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and 
universities would imperil the future of our Nation .... Teachers and 
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to 
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will 
stagnate and die.,,219 
However, while the Court has discussed the idea of academic freedom 
in cases involving states' attempts to prohibit or punish teachers for 
engaging in radical political speech, it has never fully articulated how the 
concept protects teachers, nor what standard of scrutiny applies. For 
example, in striking down a loyalty oath required of state employees as 
violative of due process, Justice Frankfurter said that teachers "must have 
the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning 
of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and 
economic dogma.,,22o The implication is that teachers have a duty to freely 
inquire as part of their job, and that their speech rights may therefore have 
higher status under the Constitution. The Court also invoked the right of 
academic freedom in overturning a university professor's contempt 
conviction for failing to respond to the state attorney general's inquiries as 
to his political associations and the nature of his lectures to students.221 
218. Id. at 603 (internal citation omitted). After discussing academic freedom, Justice 
Brennan makes it clear that the basis of the Court's rejection of the statute in question was 
vagueness, and not academic freedom. See id at 603-04. 
219. In Keyishian, the court further observed, 
''The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost 
self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is 
played by those who guide and train our youth .... No field of education is so 
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. 
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any principles are 
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion 
and distrust." 
Id at 603 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)); see also Silva v. Univ. 
of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293, 312-315, 327 (D. N.H.1994) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 603-
04. 
220. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
221. See id. at 191,196. 
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Such inquiries violated the professors' rights of political expression and 
academic freedom.222 
In 1960 the Court held unconstitutional a state law which required 
public school teachers, as a condition of employment, to file affidavits 
disclosing all organizations to which they had belonged in the past five 
years.223 The statute was found to be overly broad and unnecessarily 
intruding on teachers' associational freedoms.224 Academic freedom was 
also discussed at length in Epperson v. Arkansas,225 where a unanimous 
Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas statute which made the teaching 
of evolution in public schools a criminal offense.226 Although the Court 
based its decision on the Establishment Clause, it noted that "[t]he vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the 
community of American schools." The court further noted that it would 
"not hesitate to condemn ... 'arbitrary' restrictions upon the freedom of 
teachers to teach and students to learn.,,227 
On the other hand, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of a 
federal statute granting the Attorney General discretion to deny admission 
to an alien who advocated communism, despite the academic-freedom 
protests asserted by American university professors who wished to meet 
and speak with him. In discussing the right to receive information and 
ideas, the Court relied on a variety of non-academic freedom cases.228 In 
222. See Swe~, 354 U.S. at 250. Concurring, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan discussed the 
political and academic issues at length, and at one point equated academic and political speech (in 
both "thought and action are presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority"), and 
at another, quoting liberally from an address by T.H. Huxley at the opening of Johns Hopkins 
University. Id. at 255-267 (Frankfurter, J.,joined by Harlan, J., concurring). 
223. See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485-86, 490. 
224. See id at 490. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate dissent, in which he said that the 
state's interest in guaranteeing teacher fitness was compelling and not violative of academic 
freedom, absent any evidence that the information was used to disqualify teachers on the basis of 
their membership in certain organizations. See id at 495-96. 
225. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
226. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98-99, 102-09. 
227. See id. at 105 (quoting Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487). Justices Black and Stewart concurred, 
finding the statute to be unconstitutionally vague and unclear as to whether teachers were 
prohibited from teaching evolution or from merely mentioning the subject. Id. at 110, 115 
(Black, J., concurring) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
228. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 370-71, 390-91, 400-01 
(1969) (upholding FCC's fairness doctrine granting access rights to those holding differing views 
from the broadcast media); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (right to possess and use 
pornographic material in one's home); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 302 n.l, 305 
(1965) (striking down statute permitting government to refuse to deliver communist propaganda 
from abroad unless addressee requested its delivery in writing); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 
519, 534 (1945) (right of labor organizer to speak and of workers to hear him, regardless of 
whether organizer was registered to solicit with the state); Martin v. City of Struthers. 319 U.S. 
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holding that a Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of creationism 
alongside evolution violated the Establishment Clause, the Court 
interpreted the statute's stated secular purpose, "academic freedom," as 
merely a pretext to advance a Christian view of science.229 However, few 
cases describe academic freedom as a right to teach or advance one's 
ideas.23o Most of them identify a "right of inquiry" similar to that found 
outside the classroom, which is otherwise protected by associational 
(before associational rights were recognized) and due process rights.231 
Two somewhat conflicting sentiments, including the state's right to 
run the school system versus the Court's duty to enforce the Constitution,232 
illustrate the difficulty a clearly articulated right to academic freedom 
141-42, 149 (1943) (right to disseminate religious literature door-to-door). 
229. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586, 589, 594 (1987). "The Act does not grant 
teachers a flexibility that they did not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum 
with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin oflife." Id. at 587. 
If the [legislature'S] purpose was solely to "maximize the comprehensiveness and 
effectiveness of science instruction, it would have encouraged the teaching of all 
scientific theories about the origins of humankind. But under the Act's requirements, 
teachers who were once free to teach any and all facets of this subject are now unable 
to do so. 
Id at 588-89. Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's definition of academic freedom. In the 
context of the Louisiana law, he did not analogize it to instructor's freedom (''the freedom of 
teachers to teach what they will") but to the student's right to lrnow ("student's freedom from 
indoctrination"). Id. at 627, 631-32. The majority, however, noted that the "students' freedom 
from indoctrination" language was later deleted from the statute, and that the expert relied on by 
the Act's sponsors at legislative hearings interpreted the phrase "academic freedom" to mean ''the 
freedom to teach science." Id. at 589 n.9. 
230. See University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, 318-19 (1978) (affirming 
university's freedom to make its own decisions); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (identifYing four types of institutional academic freedom: "to determine... on 
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be 
admitted to study") Id.; but see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (academic 
freedom does not apply to non-academic activities). Legal scholars have also disagreed about 
whether academic freedom is recognized as constitutional right. See Compare, Developments in 
the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. R. 1045, 1065 (1968) (questioning existence of 
academic freedom as a constitutional right); Civil Rights-Academic Freedom, Secrecy and 
Subjectivity as Obstacles to Proving a Title VII Sex Discrimination Suit in Academia, 60 N.C. L. 
REv. 438, 446 (1982) (suggesting that academic freedom has attained the status of a 
constitutional right); see also Epperson, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05; Edwards, 482 U.S. 578, 599 
(powell J., concurring). 
231. See, e.g., Norstrand v. Balmer, 335 P.2d 10 (Wis. 1959). 
232. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104. "Our courts, however, have not failed to apply the First 
Amendment's mandate in our educational system where [it is] essential to safeguard the 
fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief." Id. "And more important, it 
would not place this Court in the unenviable position of violating the principle of leaving the 
States absolutely free to choose their own curriculums for their own schools so long as their 
action does not palpably conflict with a clear constitutional command." Id. at 112. 
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inside the classroom would raise. On one hand, meaningful education 
depends on free inquiry by instructors and students; on the other, the state's 
broad discretion as to how to run its schools and inculcate civic values 
(especially in lower schools) requires consistency and orthodoxy. A 
strongly worded declaration of academic freedom inside the classroom 
could allow teachers to invoke the Constitution to override decisions by 
superiors. 
Some lower courts have articulated a concept of academic freedom. 
For example, once contracted to appear at a public university, a speaker 
might assert a right to academic freedom to prevent a subsequent denial of 
the right to speak due to the controversial nature of his speech.233 Others 
have held that academic freedom does not outweigh a school board's 
authority to prescribe curriculum, and/or that certain types of teacher 
speech were less worthy of protection than others.234 
233. See Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Or. 1976); see also Keefe v. 
Geanakos, 418 F.2d. 359, 361-63 (1st Cir. 1969) (teacher suspended for distributing an issue of 
Atlantic Monthly magazine to students which contained offensive language, after being warned 
not to by a school committee, would probably succeed on his academic freedom claim on 
remand); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 658-59, 662 (S.D. Tex 1972) 
(teacher's dismissal for using a book on race relations not in authorized curriculum violated his 
First Amendment right to choose his own teaching methods, provided they served a 
"demonstrated educational purpose"); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1388, 1392-93 (D. 
Mass.) (teacher's dismissal for writing of the word ''Fuck'' on the blackboard for purposes ofa 
lesson violated his rights of expression and academic freedom, based on the standard that teachers 
who use methods not proven to have the support of the preponderant opinion of the profession 
may not be discharged, unless the state can show that the teacher was put on actual notice as to 
the consequences), affd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971) (noting that the 
regulation at issue was unconstitutionally vague); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 356 
(M.D. Ala. 1970) (teacher's dismissal for assigning Kurt Vonnegut's, Welcome to the Monkey 
House, violated her right to academic freedom). In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the 
Court held that a state ban on the teaching of foreign languages in public and private schools 
violated substantive due process, including the right of teachers to teach, the right of students to 
acquire useful knowledge, and the right of the students' parents to have the teacher instruct their 
children German. See id. at 396-97,399-400,403. 
234. See Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584, 586 (5th Cir. 1986) (college teacher's use of 
profanity not protected by the First Amendment); Cary v. Board of Education, 598 F.2d 535, 539, 
542, 544 (10th Cir. 1979) (recognizing right of academic freedom, but holding that teachers could 
not teach the books banned by the Board so long as, on remand, it was found that the books were 
not banned on the basis of the Board's "personal predilections"); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 
1169, 1171, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dismissal of instructor Air Force Language School due to his 
expression of anti-war sentiments and tales of discrimination he had suffered as a Jew did not 
violate his First Amendment rights); Burns v. Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270, 272, 277-78 (D. Conn. 
1979) (Board. of Education's interest in preventing "sectarian or partisan instruction" outweighed 
teacher's First Amendment interest in allowing his students to read pen-pal letters from his 
fiancee which advocated Communism); Mercer v. Board of Education, 379 F. Supp. 580, 582, 
586-87 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (public school teacher was bound to obey state's prohibition against 
the teaching of birth control to students, since he had no constitutional right to teach information 
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Some commentators have proposed that academic freedom be 
accepted as part of the common law,235 be construed as an implied 
contractual term,236 or codified into statute.237 Courts have yet to adopt any 
of these suggestions to date. 
3. Challenges 
Although the almost universal acceptance of academic freedom 
sometimes prompts professors and laymen alike to consider the subject 
somewhat moot,238 the concept has come under increasing attack in recent 
years, particularly by radical feminists.239 The claim is that academic 
freedom serves to mask "bourgeois values" or "ethnocentric 
assumptions.,,240 To the extent that this idea has gained currency, the whole 
notion of academic freedom is in jeopardy. 
C. SHADES OF REALITY 
Thus it can be seen that, under both the First Amendment and the 
doctrine of academic freedom, campus speakers clearly possess both rights 
"beyond the scope of the established curriculum"), affd memo 419 U.S. 1081 (1974). 
235. See, e.g., Robert F. Ladenson, Is Academic Freedom Necessary?, 5 LAW & PHIL. 59, 66 
(1986) (exploring the ways in which Academic Freedom can be integrated into the law as a 
"specially protected class"). 
236. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin & Robert Ladenson, University Faculty Members' Right to 
Dissent: Toward a Unified Theory of Con tactual and Constitutional Protection, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REv. 933, at 959-73 (1983). 
237. See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neill, Academic Freedom and the Constitution, 11 J.C. & U.L. 
275,290 (1984). 
238. See Polishook, supra note 201, at 146 (describing the proliferation of the notion of 
Academic Freedom since the 1960's). 
239. In a Letter circulated to campus organizations at the University of New Hampshire by an 
associate professor of women's studies, quoted in Richard Bernstein, Guilty If Charged, N.Y .. 
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 13, 1994, at 14, the following critique was made: 
The AAUP, indeed, academia itself, has traditionally been dominated by white 
heterosexual men and the First Amendment and Academic Freedom (I'll call them 
F AF) have traditionally protected the rights of white heterosexual men. Most of us 
are silenced by existing social conditions before we get the power to speak out in any 
way where FAF might protect us. So forgive us if we don't get all teary-eyed about 
FAF. Perhaps to you it's as sacrosanct as the flag or the national anthem; to us strict 
construction of the First Amendment is just another yoke around our necks. Id 
See also STANLEY E. FISH, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, 
TOO, 201-02 (1993). 
240. Gary Pavela, Deconstructing Academic Freedom, 22 J.C. & U.L. 359, 362 (1995) (book 
review). 
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and obligations. But legal principles and academic ideals sometimes mask 
the realities. Just as constitutional and academic guarantees are not 
absolute, their application is often a double-edged sword. As we have seen, 
the same places where such a liberty was vociferously advocated in the 
'Sixties were the very sites of its repression in the 'Nineties. The same 
people who stridently object to "Eurocentric white male-dominated" 
orthodoxies show themselves to be rigid about their own multicultural and 
deconstructionist agendas.241 Many modem proponents of academic 
freedom appear to invoke it only on behalf of those who buy into a radical 
perspective. Their critique of traditional merit systems may have distinct 
anti-Semitic repercussions as well. Their assault on truth and memory 
renders established norms of reason and logic virtually useless. 
The multiculturalist momentum (some might call it an onslaught) also 
makes it difficult to deal with bigotry masquerading as academic discourse 
and to respond to the inevitable and underlying question, what rights and 
responsibilities can be supported by the law? The rulings vary from case to 
case. A statewide regulation in West Virginia prohibited the sale of items 
or solicitation of funds on a public college campus, as well as distribution 
ofliterature by outside organizations?42 The court found that the regulation 
at issue was a reasonable "manner" restriction that did not unduly restrict 
the plaintiffs' right to free expression.243 The court further stated that the 
college campus was "generally open for public debate," but that restricting 
fund-raising by outside groups was a valid means of furthering educational 
goals by protecting students from the diversion of often-unwanted 
solicitation.244 More recently, the same court held that a preacher had no 
First Amendment right to object to a state regulation invoked by the 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, which required outside speakers to obtain an 
official university sponsor in order to use school facilities.245 
Perhaps the most important practical concern of universities faced 
with the question of whether to provide a forum for a controversial speaker 
is that of security. Can the cost of additional safety forces justify 
restricting or canceling appearances by outsiders? Several lower courts 
241. For a thorough critique of multiculturalism and its adherents, see generally DANIEL A. 
FARBER AND SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTII IN 
AMERICAN LAW (1997). 
242. See Gloverv. Cole, 762 F.2d 1198-99 (4th Cir. 1985). 
243. See id. at 1201, 1203. 
244. See id. at 1203. 
245. See Gilles v. Torgersen, 71 F.3d 497,498-501 (4th Cir. 1995). The appellate Court held 
that, while the case presented "interesting" constitutional questions that may need to be resolved, 
the case was not justiciable because the preacher did not assert an inability to obtain sponsorship. 
See id at 500-01. 
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have answered that question in the affinnative. For example, Clemson 
University's denial of a request for a "Vietnam Moratorium Day 
Observance," to which students from colleges across seven states would be 
invited, was upheld when university officials claimed they feared a violent 
disruption, given that one had occurred during a similar observance held a 
few weeks earlier.246 However, a policy that attempts to deny general 
university funding for controversial speakers, or that requires the host 
student organization to pay for additional security, is probably invalid. 
Such a rule would likely be held as unconstitutionally quelling 
controversial speech, while allowing "safe" speech by allocating general 
funding to pay for such speech.247 Some institutions have sought to 
discourage groups from inviting hate speakers to campus by making the 
groups themselves responsible for the costs of additional security or 
damage-insurance policies. This practice would likely be ruled 
unconstitutional if not applied to all host groups. For similar reasons, a 
university "should not permit a speaker's own security staff to dictate 
security arrangements. ,,248 
IV. REASON IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: COMMON-SENSE 
GUIDELINES 
In dealing with the new breed of controversial speakers on campus, 
there is an obvious need for strong and determined leadership to underscore 
the true goals of universities: education, as opposed to indoctrination; 
fostering dialogue, as opposed to festering discord; emphasizing 
commonality as an even higher value than diversity.249 Each case might be 
handled differently, depending upon the circumstances; but in general, the 
246. See generally Clemson Univ. Vietnam Moratoriwn Comm. v. Clemson Univ., 306 F. 
Supp. 129 (D.S.C. 1969). Clemson would have had to bolster its own security force by 
approximately 125 state marshalls to guard against violence. See id at 131. Even though the 
university had previously allowed public attendance when outside speakers were invited onto 
campus, the court found that it had no duty to extend constitutional rights to anyone other than its 
own students and faculty. The administration had told plaintiffs that they could host a Vietnam 
Moratorium Day meeting for Clemson students exclusively, inviting outside speakers of the 
students' choosing, which the court found to be sufficient accordance of the students' right to free 
expression. See id at 131-32. In finding that Clemson had no duty to import outside police 
officers in order to control the conduct of non-Clemson students on campus, the court noted that 
several other universities had recently brought in outside security forces for potentially disruptive 
events, and that their ''very presence ... [was] an incitement to violence by the students." Id. at 
133. 
247. See Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995). 
248. MARcus, supra note 10, at 160. 
249. See id; see also Burt Neubome, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Communit)' and 
Hate Speech, 27 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 371, 398-99 (1992). 
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university should seek to assure civility and a reasonable opportunity to 
debate or rebut the speaker's views. In addition, the institution should 
anticipate and be able to respond quickly and decisively to unexpected hate 
speech. 
At the same time, however, university regulations that may result in 
an inhibition of free expression on campus (especially by students and 
faculty) must be drafted in a manner that clearly states the educational 
purposes furthered by such a policy; that is to say, the goal must be to limit 
speech that "materially disrupt[s] the educational process.,,250 Once a 
university adopts a policy of inviting outside speakers onto its campus, any 
regulations must be narrowly tailored to achieve only the governmental 
interest of preventing violence on campus.251 While universities retain the 
right to determine their own academic goals, the only constitutionally 
permissible restriction on free speech to attain those goals appears to be a 
complete ban on all outside speakers. University officials cannot pick and 
choose which views they wish students to hear. An administration's 
unsupported apprehension of a campus disturbance, or its fear of offending 
student groups or the community at large, are inadequate bases for refusing 
to allow recognized student groups to invite controversial outside speakers 
on campus. Moreover, the few cases that have upheld administrators' 
regulatory actions on security bases seemed to require actual past violence 
resulting from the outside speaker at issue.252 
When drafting speech regulations, universities should beware that 
certain phrases have been judicially struck down as unconstitutionally 
vague or overbroad. For example, a regulation that prohibits "advocacy" of 
unlawful action by an outside speaker will likely be deemed invalid, unless 
the speaker is calling for immediate unlawful action. The mere "presence" 
of a controversial person on campus as an incitement is likely an 
insufficient basis for a college to bar that person's speech; the issues are 
what the speaker says and does, not his presence. "In such 
circumstances ... attendant law enforcement officers must quell the mob, 
not the speaker.,,253 Another problematic regulation is the type which 
prohibits religious services on campus. While such a ban is 
constitutionally permitted (if not required), only religious services can be 
250. Healy, 408 U.S. at 184, 187-89 (internal citation omitted). 
251. See Thomas v. CoIlins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Cohen v. San Bernardino College, 883 
F. Supp. 1407, 1409-10 (1995). 
252. Likewise, if the speaker's past conduct is an issue, the timing of past violent episodes is 
relevant; if violence occurred on a college campus many years ago, that fact standing alone may 
be insufficient to ban the speaker. See Stacy, 306 F. Supp. at 976. 
253. Id. at 977. 
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banned, not discussion ofreIigious topicS.254 
In reviewing a university's speech policies, a court is also likely to 
look for a standard of reasonableness. For example, where a regulation 
requires a speaker's topic to be "relevant" or "competent" as it relates to 
educational goals, the rule should specify which individual or office is to 
judge what topics are relevant and what criteria will be used. Similarly, a 
type of regulation that prohibits speakers who "speak in a libelous, 
scurrilous or defamatory manner or in violation of public laws which 
prohibit incitement to riot" would likely require specificity regarding who 
will decide such matters and by what standards.255 While the courts have 
held that a university's reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on 
speech are constitutionally permitted, a general regulation that allows 
officials to bar a speaker where the invitation or its timing are not "in the 
best interests of the University" will likely be struck down as 
unconstitutionally vague.256 
Universities which seek to prohibit on-campus speech that disparages 
or is offensive to racial and ethnic minorities may appear to further the 
educational goal of maintaining order on campus, as well as restraining 
"low-value" speech which possesses the sole purpose of degrading people. 
However, no such code has yet to pass constitutional muster.257 
A model anti-harassment regulation has been suggested for use by 
universities seeking to protect and attract minority students. It prohibits 
expression that is directed at religious, racial, or historically oppressed 
groups, is derogatory to the point of directly or impliedly denying the 
humanity of the group, or is expressed in an exclusionary manner which 
threatens the academic or social participation of the group. This type of 
policy must be carefully drafted because it is content-based.258 
The American Communication Association's Model Campus Speech 
Code suggests four areas that state and private institutions should address. 
The first focuses on the primary responsibility of the university community 
to protect the right of free expression. The second obligates the university 
to provide and publicize a public common area where the academic 
community and non affiliated persons can peacefully dissent and 
254. Id. at 975. 
255. See Smith v. Univ. of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777, 779, 782-83 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). 
256. Id at 783. 
257. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of 
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
309-310 (1940); but see generally Deborah R. Schwartz, A First Amendment Justification for 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 733 (1990). 
258. See Schwartz, supra note 257, at 777-78. 
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demonstrate. The third section protects any speaker who faculty or 
students have invited to express his or her viewpoints. Under this section, 
the university should commit itself to maintaining an atmosphere where 
open, vigorous debate can occur, and provide funding to student 
organizations who invite speakers on a content-neutral basis. The right to 
dissent, in its many forms, is permitted so long as the audience does not 
substantially interfere with the speaker's ability to communicate. Finally, 
the Model Code suggests sanctions for those who violate the free speech 
rights of others, including expulsion, arrest, warning, written reprimand, 
sensitivity training, suspension, or a note of the violation placed on a 
transcript or personnel file.259 
In general, universities must draft speech policies carefully, 
considering the type of environment regulated, its resulting standard of 
judicial review, and whether the regulated speech affects student/faculty 
rights or those of the general public. Where the university, especially a 
public college, has opened a forum to outside speakers, it is likely that a 
decision to exclude controversial speakers will be held unconstitutional 
unless clear and substantial evidence suggests the likelihood of serious 
disturbances on campus. Just as students and faculty at a public institution 
cannot be denied an exchange of ideas and opinions, initiated either by 
themselves or outsiders, neither are university administrators powerless to 
maintain order in pursuing their educational mission. 
University officials faced with the prospect of a controversial speaker 
on campus should make it clear that neither violence, destruction of 
property, nor hecklers' vetoes permitted. On the other hand, counter-
demonstrations to hate speech will likewise be protected, as will protests on 
other controversial issues. Moreover, in appropriate circumstances such 
demonstrations may be joined by administrators and other campus leaders. 
Civil discourse should always be encouraged, with the university taking the 
moral high ground.260 In addition, virtually any college or university, 
whether public or private, should adhere to guidelines suggested by a 
careful and reasoned review of established case law and commentary: 
• Develop and publish the procedures that must be followed in 
order for an outside speaker to be brought onto campus. 
Contact everyone in the chain of administrative command 
259. ACA Model Campus Speech Code, available in, <http://cavern.uark.edulcomminfo/www/ 
campus.speech.html>. 
260. The president of the university or college should know about controversial speakers and 
advise those who invited them to consider the repercussions and perhaps urge them to withdraw 
the invitation. He or she might consider reaching out as well to alienated groups and joining a 
protest demonstration. See MARcus, supra note 10, at 160. 
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(including the president or chancellor) each time a speaker's 
appearance is at issue. Do not vary from these procedures: An 
exception made in one speaker's favor may be cited later by 
another who's been denied a similar platform to support a claim 
that the discriminatory application of the procedures violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
• Make the basesfor canceling a speaker clear and /h(trough, and 
apply them consistently. A speaker can be constitutionally 
barred or canceled if (a) there is a likelihood of clear and 
present danger on the basis of past appearances that resulted in 
disruptions (or if students who oppose the speaker present a 
realistic threat of imminent violence),261 and/or (b) the 
sponsoring institution is unable to meet security requirements.262 
Even though this choice might have the effect of a heckler's 
veto, the university should assert its responsibility to avoid a 
material disruption of the educational process.263 Arguments can 
also be made that the public university is less capable than the 
state itself in managing violent confrontations resulting from 
public speech; that, acting to a limited degree in loco parentis, it 
has a greater responsibility to protect against violent responses 
by their students than does the state to curb those of its citizens; 
and that it should have the capacity to punish those who create 
disruptions on campus (by either canceling the speaker's 
engagement and/or expelling the students who threatened the 
trouble). 
• Do not cancel a speaker based merely on the content of the 
93 
261. This rule may be applied even if the speaker played not part in the disturbance. Although 
there may be no clear and present danger if the speaker is attacked by hecklers, the likelihood of 
such a scenario may still qualify under existing jurisprudence as the type of potential disruption 
which satisfies the Constitution in a pUblic-university setting. See Holmes, supra note 48, at AI, 
BIO (noting that Howard turned down a request by Muhammad to speak at Howard a third time 
after he was wounded at a rally in California); see also Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1333-
35 (6th Cir. 1972) (student's jacket modeled on rebel flag was banned as a "provocative symbol" 
about one year after the school had to discontinue using the Confederate flag as their school flag 
because this had incited various disturbances that culminated in the imposition of a city-wide 
curfew). 
262. This standard would have less of an effect on speakers who can supply their own 
security, although the choice of security should be left to the college or university. A school 
might decline to use a speaker's own security force if it fears that by doing so it would 
compromise its own standards. See Melillo & Harris, supra note 50, at Bl (reporting that when 
the Howard auditorium started filling up, the Nation ofIslam security force gave priority seating 
to black men). 
263. See Pam Belluck, Appearance by Farrakhan Aide Roils a CUNY Campus, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 1995, at B3. The reporter discusses the decision of CUNY's President to let Muhammad 
speak, though he had tried to cancel his speech, for fear that students who supported him would 
be injured in a clash with police. Certainly this is not a heckler's veto situation (it is in fact the 
opposite), but if the possibility of violence to students inspired a President to cancel a speaker, 
some courts might overlook the heckler's veto. 
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speech or the speaker's reputation or character.264 
• Refrain from using "legalese. ,,265 
• In the absence of exceptional circumstances, grant only one or 
two administrators the power to cancel a speaker's 
appearance.266 
• Do not allow a controversial speaker unilaterally to dictate 
security arrangements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Most courts adhere to a public policy that the university should be 
preserved as a "marketplace of ideas," while at the same time maintaining 
the right of administrators to make decisions they deem in the best interest 
of their institution's educational mission. The tension inherent in those 
competing values is reflected by what happens when controversial speech 
occurs on campus. Much of the case law is a vestige of campus unrest in 
the late '60's and early '70's, when the courts sought strongly to protect 
what they perceived as the constitutional right of students to hear all types 
of views on any subject. That principle has been sorely tested with the rise 
of politically-correct and radical agendas, promoted by academic 
deconstructionists and outspoken social reformers. One result has been the 
promulgation of speech and conduct codes - all of which when challenged 
in court, have to date been found unconstitutional. 
Those speech and conduct codes which have yet to be challenged 
continue to be applied arbitrarily. New rules and regulations, and the 
inevitable litigation they spawn, are likely to be seen in the future - unless 
universities adopt policies and procedures that allow them to keep 
controversial speech on campus within realistic and constitutional limits, 
while encouraging vigorous, constructive, and responsible commerce in the 
marketplace of ideas. 
The guidelines offered above should be useful for that purpose, while 
at the same time keeping proponents of hate, such as Khalid Muhammad, 
constitutionally at bay. 
264. See, e.g., Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486, 497 (M.D. N.C. 1968); Snyder v. Board 
ofTrustees, 286 F. Supp. 927, 933-934 (N.D. III. 1968). 
265. Do not, for example, ban all speakers who would create a "clear or present danger" or 
"material disruption" on campus. Such language wiII likely be held void for vagueness. See 
Stacy, 306 F. Supp. at 976-977. 
266. Even then, the power should be exercised only where there are clearly constitutional 
grounds to do so and the administration is invoked to give the appearance of fmality. See, e.g., 
Brooks, 412 F.2d at 1173 (internal citation omitted); Stacy, 306 F. Supp. at 971. 
